

Research Note 84-62

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TRAINING OBJECTIVES FOR TANK PLATOON LEADERS:
INTERVIEW EXCERPTS AND ANALYSIS


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U. S. ARMY

Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

February 1984

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER Research Note 84-62	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. AD-A138 725	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) TRAINING OBJECTIVES FOR TANK PLATOON LEADERS: INTERVIEW EXCERPTS AND ANALYSIS		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Research Note December, 1982 - December, 1983
		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(s) Henry J. Zagorski and Kenneth M. Travis		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s) MDA 903-83-C-0018
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Plog Research, Inc. 18631 Sherman Way Reseda, California 91335		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS 63743A, 2Q263743A794, 3354, 208
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS U.S. Army Research Institute Fort Knox Field Unit, Steele Hall Fort Knox, KY 40121		12. REPORT DATE February 1984
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 74
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for open release, distribution unlimited.		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES This research was monitored technically by Dr. David W. Bessemer, Fort Knox Field Unit, Army Research Institute.		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Armor Training Platoon Leader Training Leadership Training Training Standards Tactical Training Training Objectives		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Focus group research was conducted to evaluate a new format for preparing Army training objectives for tactical leadership tasks. A second objective was concerned with the approach to be taken in extending this format to include training standards for use in after-action reviews. Twelve groups of Army personnel knowledgeable in tactical leadership were interviewed. The new format was perceived as potentially useful in tactical leadership training. Alternatives regarding the extension of the format to include training standards were provided by the participants.		

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Unclassified

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**TRAINING OBJECTIVES FOR TANK PLATOON LEADERS:
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TRAINING OBJECTIVES FOR TANK PLATOON LEADERS: INTERVIEW EXCERPTS AND ANALYSIS

INTRODUCTION

This study concerns the evaluation of a new format proposed by O'Brien and Drucker (1983) for describing tactical leadership training objectives. It also examines important aspects of the approach to be taken in extending this format to encompass tactical standards for use in performance-oriented feedback. The resource requirements for collecting and feeding back tactical performance data on tank platoon leaders during field exercises are also addressed. Using a focus group technique especially adapted for the Army environment, dynamic interviews were conducted with 12 groups of four to nine participants intimately familiar with the tactical training and evaluation of tank platoon leaders. Each group conducted an intensive examination of the new format and discussed various ramifications thereof including rationale, content, usefulness, extensibility, and other characteristics that are pertinent to the format's further development and refinement.

This research note provides a comprehensive summary of the interview content and findings that furnished the data base for the evaluation presented in the research report for this project. The dynamic group interviews took place during two separate time periods (Phase I and Phase II). Within each phase, the interview findings are organized by major topics that are relevant to the evaluation. Interview content related to these findings is presented separately for each group of participants. The interview excerpts provide an unusual opportunity for an in-depth perception of the complex attitudinal and motivational forces involved in implementing an Army training program.

RESEARCH PROCEDURES

Interview Technique

During the introduction to the interview, the purpose of the group meeting was briefly described to the participants. They were then given a background questionnaire (see Appendix J) to fill out and a name card on which only first names or nicknames were used. In all other respects, the interview procedures and questionnaire forms were anonymous. Cassette tape recordings were made of the interviews. It was explained that this was being done only for analysis purposes so as not to overlook important features of the group's reactions to the topics being presented.

Each focus group interview took approximately two hours, although the Phase II meetings tended to be somewhat longer. The interviews were structured around a sequential list of topics as described in Appendixes B and C. The early part of the interviews was designed to get the group participants to talk freely about the tactical training of tank platoon leaders. Then, to assist them in focusing on specific features of the O'Brien-Drucker methodology, visual aids were distributed to each participant and explained (see Appendixes D through H). Complete examples of the O'Brien-Drucker formats were included in the visual aids. These examples were specially illustrated so that the major format features would stand out sharply in contrast to the detailed content. The participants were asked to react first to the overall structure of the format and later were queried concerning the detailed content therein.

After the participants had reacted to the format and content, the interviewers probed their views concerning extensions of the methodology into the realm of training standards and field data collection. Considerable time was spent on these aspects during the Phase II interviews. The Phase II interviews also delved into the subject of evaluation resource requirements, whereas the Phase I interviews did not.

At the conclusion of each Phase II group interview, the participants completed a short questionnaire in which the O'Brien-Drucker methodology was rated on four factors concerning the tactical training and evaluation of tank platoon leaders. In the Phase I interviews, the ratings were given orally and were of a general nature. Observer ratings of group reactions were made for both the Phase I and Phase II interviews.

Analysis Procedures

The interview proceedings encompassed approximately 30 hours of voice recordings. During analysis, these recordings were replayed a number of times in order to extract interview segments potentially useful for reporting.

The interview segments were grouped under major topical categories. For the Phase I interviews, the categories were Format, Content, and Training Assumptions. For the Phase II interviews the categories were Training Objectives, Standards Development, and Evaluation Resources. Verbatim portions of the interview segments that best illustrated the responses of the participants

to each of these categories were selected for inclusion in this research note. These comments were also used to prepare the concise findings described in the research report for this project.

The responses to the items in the background questionnaire were tallied separately for each focus group participating in the Phase I interviews. These groups were arranged into an approximate rank-order based on interviewee ratings as shown in Table 1. A visual inspection was then made to locate items whose response tallies appeared to reflect some kind of tie-in between background and rating. A somewhat similar procedure was used for the Phase II interviews. However, since the ratings for the Phase II interviews had more structure, it was possible to examine background tie-ins separately for four different methodology rating factors to which the interviewees responded. This visual inspection of background items and rating trends led to the three-way classification and analysis appearing in Table 3.

PHASE I INTERVIEW FINDINGS

Detailed findings for the Phase I interviews are presented here. The findings basically address the quality and potential utility of training objectives contained in the O'Brien-Drucker format. They are organized into three primary topical categories: (1) format, (2) content, and (3) training implications. Focus group reactions are described under each of these categories along with illustrative verbatim comments.

Format

The noncommissioned officer (NCO) instructors group generally expressed an enthusiastic response to the format. They made comments like the following:

Good format.

The execution component looks pretty good.

Good format. It gives the task and mission description.

It's more broken-down so that the accomplishment of each objective is attached to subtasks.

The relevance of the format was emphasized in the following discussion between a moderator and an NCO instructor.

NCO instructor: If it (the format) was broken down by ARTEP (Army Training and Evaluation Program) mission into platoon leader tasks, that would help us.

Moderator: How far is this from that?

NCO instructor: Not far at all.

The infantry platoon leaders initially reacted to what they perceived as ambiguity in the format. For example:

I'm not sure what the command component is.

Explain the execution component.

Upon closer scrutiny, however, this group was able to ascertain the necessity for and purpose served by the different components, particularly when attention was devoted to specific areas of the format. For example:

It's overwhelming at first but necessary.

The decision component is good. The breakdown permits a determination of the lieutenant's proficiency in a specific area.

Frequent use of the word "overwhelming" here and in other groups suggests potential problems with the format as expressed in the following comment from the infantry group.

The format is too busy, not immediately obvious; the description is too detailed.

An infantry platoon leader offered a suggestion concerning the manner in which the format could be made more useful:

The format could go further. Specific tasks should be placed under specific ARTEP missions.

The tank platoon leaders expressed the following comments regarding the tendency of the format to resemble a checklist.

NTC (National Training Center) gave me distrust for a list. I was blamed for not conforming to a checklist even though I successfully completed my mission.

A list takes initiative, imagination out of the platoon leader.

This antipathy toward checklists, however, was not unanimous as reflected in the following comment:

NTC was good training. After action reviews were for troop commanders and platoon leaders. This would make a good checklist.

Among the tank platoon leaders it was evident that value was attached to the format's tie-in with ARTEP. For example:

It's good for an evaluator of ARTEP to determine thought processes and identify weaknesses and training necessary to address them.

Among the first group of armor officer advanced course (AOAC) students (Group 7) the meaningfulness of the format was questioned as follows:

The component terms are unfamiliar, too general, not meaningful.

You don't need a separate command component. That's part of task execution.

The command component is the issuance of a frag order, which is an action task.

On the other hand, these AOAC participants made the following supportive comments regarding the format:

The overall decision format is good.

I like it.

It's clear, concise, orderly, logical. The skeleton is there. It can be modified.

It lays everything out. It puts together components leading to an objective. It's a cookbook by which you can come up with a cake.

I like this. It's an excellent tool. You know what the platoon leader can do and under what conditions he's been given training. You can compare their performance under current conditions with their performance under specified conditions.

A significant weakness in the format that was brought out by these AOAC students concerned the failure to specify task outcomes. For example:

It doesn't connect actions with specific results.

The components should be rewritten in goal-oriented verbiage.

There are no specific goals.

Nowhere does it really say that he (the trainee) effectively accomplished the task.

Whether the decision results in success is what matters.

In the second AOAC group (Group 6) the participants felt rather strongly that the format itself, i.e., the component structure and the outline mode of presentation, could easily encourage its exclusive use as an evaluative tool. They felt obliged to offer the following suggestions:

Get rid of "components"--call the subtasks what they really are.

Kill the outline format; an outline leads to task-condition-standards.

In general, participants in the second AOAC student group seemed to feel that the ideal function of the O'Brien-Drucker format was one of guidance rather than evaluation. They tended to direct their format commentaries toward the maximization of the guidance function.

Among the officer instructors, a notable sentiment expressed was that the format is basically a rearrangement of material already in use. For example:

It basically covers what we do now. There are some idiosyncratic differences. It's just formatted differently, called by different names.

If you give them this, they'd have to throw something away, because they've got something already, and it's useful. . . . I'm not saying this is junk, because it is a good document, but then again, how necessary is it to restate what we're doing.

The following comment is given to show that the officer instructors were willing to concede the soundness of the format given appropriate modification and application:

There's nothing here that's wrong. The format is OK for developing training objectives.

Generally speaking, the format was seen by the officer instructors as reasonably sound. The basic problem, expressed in this group, was that similar products are already in use.

The company commanders' focus group also tended to feel that the format tended to be a recomposition of material already in use. They made the following comments:

This is nothing new--just a different format.

This is just another way of saying things.

Additionally, the company commanders viewed the comprehensibility of the format as being problematical with the following comments:

It's complicated.

The format blows me away.

No one will know what you're talking about.

The company commanders tended to raise questions concerning the utility of the format. One member of this group offered the following comment:

I think we've gotten too wrapped around steps. It's not whether he went through all the steps there, but does he understand the principles and does he know when he can violate a certain principle in order to gain an advantage. If they understand the principles, the steps will flow naturally from those principles. This, I think, is trying to teach it ass-backwards.

However, there were several company commanders who were quite enthusiastic about the material presented to them. For example:

This would be helpful. The stuff in here is pretty damn good.

Content

The NCO instructors reacted to the O'Brien-Drucker content with comments such as the following:

It's good.

Outstanding.

When asked by a moderator to explain the why of this reaction, one group member remarked:

Because it goes into detail.

Later this group indicated that the content failed to account for nuclear-biological-chemical activities, time constraints, and mission considerations. Thus, their view concerning the adequacy of the content was in actuality somewhat less glowing than that originally reflected.

Flaws in the content received several criticisms from the NCO instructors. For example:

Use radio only when necessary.

Clarify command task VI A 4 and 5.

Command task VI A 4 should be an instantaneous reaction by the platoon leader.

When pressed concerning possible clumsiness of the content, the NCO instructors indicated that with sufficient training time this would not be a problem. However, in the following concluding remarks, members of this group suggested that the content be condensed to increase efficiency:

Cut out repetition.

Condense it, but do not necessarily subtract.

The infantry platoon leaders rated the content high on adequacy as reflected in the following comments:

This is sufficient.

It's complete.

However, later comments in this group seemed to suggest room for improving thoroughness. For example:

You need to get deeper into the tactical leadership activities. These you have here assume knowledge of what to do about various things.

The general response of the infantry platoon leaders to the content was enthusiastic. They seemed to feel that it was thorough, accurate, and sufficiently original to present utility in training.

The tank platoon leaders like their infantry counterparts felt that the content was relatively thorough. In the following remark, one tank platoon leader explained why the inclusion of such detail was necessary, as opposed to "sifting":

If you sift, and I've seen this done in my years in the Army, all you get is wrong impressions, misinformation. If I as a leader perceive differently than what doctrine or my company commander or battalion commander or task force commander perceive, I'm going to fall on my bayonet. I may get somebody killed and the last thing I want to do is get somebody killed if I could have prevented it by knowing where my weak points are and gauging up against the tasks I need to know.

As a caveat, however, several members of this group suggested that the level of detail was more appropriate to use as a training guide rather than a field training procedure. For example:

It's impractical in the field as a checklist--it's too long. It's OK as a thought process.

It's too unwieldy for the platoon leader to work with in the field environment.

It is appropriate for an after-action review to determine what needs to be done.

I would use this after training to ask what I failed to do.

The tank platoon leaders, as did other groups, made note of the omission of mission considerations and time constraints in the content for the command task. However, this group tended to de-emphasize such content flaws. They saw the content as having high potential utility, as seen in the following comments:

As a thought process, this is good. After training in the field, I can look at this and find out what I did wrong.

This should be given as a thought process to the new trainee.

The first group of AOAC students (Group 7) took more issue with flaws in the content. For example:

Command task VII C 3 is wrong. You don't stop.

Command task VII A 1 and 2 are subjective and not meaningful.

I disagree with command task V C. One, two, and three may not be present and you still may have to do fire and movement.

They also directed criticism at the failure to include mission considerations and enemy force specifications in the content for the command task. As this group perceived flaws in the content, they tended to question the research as shown in the following comments:

There was not enough research.

The research was inadequate. It detracted from the whole concept.

The second group of AOAC students (Group 6) suggested, like most of the other groups, that the level of detail in the content precluded direct field use but permitted use as a study aid. More specific content criticisms in this group addressed the fear that the product would become misused as an evaluation instrument. For example:

Change "will" to "should" so it sounds less like doctrine.

Get rid of "will", "won't".

I don't like the wording of the decision principles. I think what they're saying is, "You might consider fire and movement if"

Other criticisms in this group were directed at portions of the content that were obsolete or flawed. For example:

Most of the command task Section VI A is obsolete because the whole platoon rather than the section is now used.

They have taken a lot of good sources here and consolidated them. I would rate the content even higher if they cleaned up the duplication and errors and brought this more up-to-date.

In the following comments, this group of AOAC students expressed the opinion that the interactive nature of the tank platoon leader's tasks was not adequately addressed:

The biggest thing wrong with this is that it's written as if the platoon is isolated. It's not.

This produces tunnel vision--there's input from the company commander and output to the company commander.

Platoon leaders should be communicating and coordinating.

In general, the second group of AOAC students felt that the primary problems in the content were those of obsolescence and "dictatorial" tone. However, because of their perception of thoroughness in the content (e.g., "A for effort"), these flaws were considered highly correctable rather than fatal.

The comments of the officer instructors regarding content tended to have an equivocal quality. For example:

I'll say something positive. There's nothing here that's wrong.

The general impression conveyed by the officer instructors was that the content was redundant with existing materials.

The company commanders also felt that the content was not sufficiently unique to warrant its introduction as another training manual. Additionally, criticism was directed at the level of detail as reflected in the following comment:

You're insulting the trainee's intelligence. You're assuming their ignorance, providing too much detail.

The company commanders questioned the meaningfulness of specific content items. For example:

Does the enemy have tank-defeating weapons? We would know this. It's too elementary and obvious.

These are not the only things affecting fire and movement.

Whose visibility is being referred to?

Command task Section VII C 3 is wrong.

As the result of perceived content flaws such as those above, the company commanders also tended to question the research adequacy.

Training Implications

The NCO instructors reacted to the fine-grain detail portrayed in the O'Brien-Drucker format as follows:

The action-type task looks good, so does the command-type task. Why? Because it goes into detail.

Would like to show this to my platoon leaders--make them think a bit.

If we could take them by the hand and teach them this, we would have the best-led platoons in the world.

They will learn more by this approach.

From the above comments, it appears that the NCO instructors felt that the tactical aspects of the tank platoon leader's job ideally should be trained at a very fine level of detail. However, there was a crosscurrent of opinion in this group indicating that fine-grain tactical decision training posed practical problems. Illustrative comments along this line were as follows:

Would be outstanding if we could cover all this material, but there just isn't enough time to do it.

You say there are 34 critical tasks like this. This is far too much to train and even more to be able to evaluate.

Content is outstanding. However, in order to cover this material, the training course would need to be much, much longer.

They only broad brush this in school. If they tried to do something this detailed, they would have to displace other things and that would be tough.

Like many other participants, the NCO instructors felt that a tactically effective tank platoon leader must be mature, observant, aggressive, think, and use common sense. Here are typical comments:

Intelligence plus common sense plus tactical knowledge. Tank platoon leaders having this don't stay long as tank platoon leaders. They are quickly grabbed up by battalion and assigned to S-3 or something like that.

It's not just understanding the decision processes and principles. He's got to be able to apply them, to use common sense. Only way to do this is to take him out in the field to see if he can apply these things.

On the topic of maturity, the following NCO instructor comments are pertinent:

Some tank platoon leaders take the wrong attitude. They get nervous when they are new and try to do everything themselves. They don't have to do this.

With seasoning they become more trusting. The principle here is not just to listen to your subordinates, but to develop a spirit of intraplatoon coordination and cooperation. One for all and all for one and that sort of thing.

He has to learn to use the resources of his subordinates properly. For example, if you have a good driver, he knows what he has to do; you don't have to spend your time telling him what to do.

This group also placed a high value on ARTEP and liked very much the way O'Brien and Drucker tied in their material on training objectives with ARTEP missions and tasks. For example:

First thing you go to is the ARTEP reference.

Would be nice if you first had the ARTEP task, then supplemented it with this information here on the tank platoon leader's decision, command, and execution components.

The infantry platoon leader group likewise acknowledged the value of the fine-grain level of detail employed in the O'Brien-Drucker approach. Illustrative comments were as follows:

You should overwhelm the platoon leader. He should not be afraid of all this detail. There are thousands of things that he must learn to manage.

Can see it as overwhelming at first, but this is necessary.

This is like the Crawl-Walk-Run idea. First you have to crawl, that is, learn all these detailed things; then you have to walk, that is, learn how to integrate the details; then you have to run, that is, integrate the integrations under stress. This is good at the Crawl level.

You need to go even deeper into some of these detail things that the platoon leader should do. There is no entry level here. That also should be included and explained in detail.

This is very detailed and very good. I like the question style used in the descriptions.

The infantry platoon leaders, too, had some concerns regarding the practical implementation of highly detailed information in tactical training. For example:

First impression is that this is a lot of detail, especially when you times it by 34 critical tasks to be learned.

Some of this can be done in the classroom, although it would tend to be boring there and put you to sleep.

From their vantage point as infantry platoon leaders in NTC exercises, members of this group voiced a number of criticisms of tank officers (platoon leaders). They felt that armored officers emphasize speed, mobility, and punch, but are typically remiss when it comes to reconnaissance and control of their elements. As examples, they made the following comments:

Tank officers barely know the meaning of reconnaissance.

Their leadership is not up to snuff. They don't know how to control their elements.

This guy is sharp, I know him. But he goofed and so did his commander. He had great difficulty reading the terrain at NTC and selecting his tank positions, and he got smashed.

The tank platoon leaders were well prepared in basics, but they failed when they got to NTC. They knew their tasks, but were easily overwhelmed. They could not manage their resources all at once like they had to there.

The tank platoon leader group likewise acknowledged the value of the highly detailed level of information employed in the O'Brien-Drucker format. However, there appeared to be an undercurrent of disagreement within this group concerning just exactly how the material could be best used in training. The following comments reflect this variation:

Very well thought out and presented. I prefer this as compared to the manuals. Tells me exactly what I need to know. I'm not saying forget the manuals. But just give me the 34 critical tasks like this and the ARTEP stuff that goes with it and send me to the field.

I could use this as a great outline to determine if my thought processes are working OK.

I agree. Looks like an excellent tool. Tells you what thought processes you should be going through.

I like this. It's coming out of manuals that already exist and maybe this just reduces down to common sense, but this way of looking at it helps.

I agree that this does need quite a bit of cleaning up and pinpointing of real training objectives and principles, but this is a great step forward and in the right direction.

The action component is labeled differently, but it has the same underlying thought processes as the command and execution components. They both break down what should be taking place in your mind. This is good; it puts it down on paper so you can find your thinking flaws. Anything that helps you find thinking flaws is valuable.

This decision component lays out the thought processes and is good in that respect. In other words, "What did I forget to consider in my thinking?"

We have to keep it simple and stupid as they say. The thought processes have to be simplified like this.

I could use this after but not during NTC in order to help me in my learning.

You could use this in sand table problems as a training aid.

This looks like it is more for the trainer of tank platoon leaders than the platoon leader himself. If the trainers could convert this for use out in the field at NTC, it would make an excellent platoon briefing guide.

I don't see any training objectives here. But I do see something that can be valuable to me.

The training objective in this thing is to teach thought processes. This should be done in the classroom as an exercise in thought processes.

Maybe most if not all of the necessary ingredients are here, but how the tank platoon leader mixes them in accomplishing his mission is up to him.

The tank platoon leader can't be a complete artist. You've got to be predictable at least to a certain extent. The Army tries to make us predictable. That's why we need standardized doctrine like this. But there is a question here of how much the platoon leader should be predictable and how much artistry and imagination he should show.

You could use this as an FM 71-1 or ARTEP 71-2 supplement. But you have to be careful not to get this thing perverted. Things always seem to get perverted somehow. Don't pervert this into a memory test like the Army often does. Then it won't be any good.

Only way this is useful is as an informal procedure to help you find out what your thinking problems are. You would not want to use this in a formal way. Can't see that you can use this as a Go or No-Go technique.

You could use this as a method to find useful topics to talk about to help you improve as a tank platoon leader. Yes, that's the only way you can use it.

They did something good here, but not what they were supposed to do. If you want training objectives, you determine if the tank platoon leader knows how to call in fire and navigate and things like that. This stuff is good mostly for general discussion.

Is this to be another manual? There certainly is a surplus of manuals in the Army.

There's no guarantee that if you know this you will accomplish your mission. You are forgetting the human aspect of this thing. How do you know what is in my mind? This is a thought process that takes place in my mind in seconds. No way can you evaluate that.

I personally like FM 71-1 and FM 71-2 better than this. Something like this I would never try to do. It's just too dry and boring.

As a tank platoon leader, I would not even look at this.

Since all the tank platoon leaders had recent experience at NTC, they related what an impression this experience made on them. For example:

I don't think AOB (Armor Officer Basic) prepared me very well for NTC. AOB was lacking in realistic training.

Main thing is that NTC is a complete shock the first three days at least. This is nothing like textbooks. You need to put tank officers out in this type of thing more often. Some officers are able to overcome it and some are not. No place better than NTC.

There's so much coming at you at NTC. Numerous communication nets. It's a great big juggling act. Tank platoon leaders should be given training in being able to juggle things. Simultaneous activities going on at the same time and you have to make split-second decisions.

Also you have got to learn to delegate, to pass off some of the overload on you. You have got to do things simple and stupid and teach it that way. The tank crews have to share in the work load. You have to train the leaders not only to lead, but to delegate.

It would appear then that the job of the tank platoon leader in combat is much like a juggling act in which the leader himself quickly becomes overloaded and must learn how to share his work load with his subordinates. There is also the element of cooperation and trusting of subordinates as described in previous comments, i.e., not trying to be a solitary leader who tries to direct everybody in all things while ignoring the abilities of his subordinates to do things without his constant direction.

The first group of AOAC students (Group 7) also acknowledged the value of the training material portrayed in the O'Brien-Drucker format. Representative comments were as follows:

I take this as a training vehicle and I like it.

This is basically a cookbook by which a trainer can come up with a cake. I like the ingredients. I can use this as a training tool.

I like the parts like the decision component. It gives me a better training tool.

What are the intentions with these formats? Maybe basic armor training. Possibly. From that perspective I like it.

This frag order layout gives you some background. You don't have to start out as a damn fool.

This group of AOAC students took issue with certain aspects of the material, as reflected in the following comments:

You don't take this thing into the field. You have got to be trained before you get there. This is a training vehicle

by which you program the lieutenant in order for him to react doctrinally. Can't be anything but a training tool.

Nowhere does it say here whether he accomplished the mission. In other words, all this detail leads to "So what?"

Probably needs to be rewritten in a more goal-oriented fashion focusing on the actual results achieved. If the platoon leader accomplishes his mission, then I'm happy. But this doesn't tell me this.

The decision principles are not explained to me adequately.

The decision and execution principles kind of wander into the fog. It appears like they are trying to give a standard, but there is no standard given.

What does it mean when it says, "The platoon leader stops when enemy fire is highly effective?" What does that mean? It doesn't make sense to stop.

Someone should go through these principles and refine them, e.g., when do you actually stop fire and movement? Same thing for the frag order. There are other times you are going to issue a frag order.

The format is nice. It has a lot of merit. But the research was inadequate. It needs a lot more work.

The first group of AOAC students showed a common tendency observed in all the groups of being unable to separate the platoon leader from the tank platoon as a whole. Also, they felt that there is nothing really unique that distinguishes the platoon leader from his subordinates except possibly decision-making which they considered more of a leadership skill than a tactical skill. For example, the following comments were made:

There is nothing special about the tank platoon leader except his making the yes-no decision when it comes down to the nitty-gritty.

There is no special difference between the platoon leader and the tank commander. Difference is in confidence, calmness, experience. Tactics is good trusted teamwork. Doing things automatically. But nothing really unique.

This group also valued ARTEP, as evidenced by the following comments:

If the platoon leader can run his platoon through the ARTEP tasks, then he is good. If you can meet those ARTEP standards, then you are good.

The ARTEP decides who is good and who is poor. ARTEP gives you the tactical task while the soldier's manual gives you the skills to do those tasks.

The second group of AOAC students (Group 6) likewise valued the tactical training detail portrayed in the O'Brien-Drucker format. However, they, too, varied in their views regarding the manner in which this detail should be put to use. Illustrative comments were as follows:

In terms of being a training guide, this is very thorough. It's just great for sitting around the orderly room with a platoon leader and platoon sergeant. But you wouldn't want to tape this up onto the cupola of the tank.

If you got this, all the details are there. This is good if you go out with the tank platoon leader and practice it. Point out to him what he did wrong and show him how to correct it.

This is not sufficient by itself. The company commander has to sit down with the lieutenant and explain to him how this is to be used.

Maybe you can add a section for the company commander to amplify on. You could add all kinds of situations that the company commander can teach, for example, SOP (standard operating procedure) actions.

In AOB, you could not do this training; there just isn't enough time. He won't really click on tasks like fire and movement until he has actually been in an attack. This is better keyed to the apprentice platoon leader, one that is newly assigned to a unit.

There were concerns expressed in this group regarding the possible misuses of the O'Brien-Drucker material. The following comments reflect these concerns:

We are still too close to the platoon leaders as compared to higher officers, ex-officer or civilians. We are afraid to see them getting burnt with this thing. This material readily lends itself to abuse.

You could put another section on here like standards and even score the tank platoon leader. It is possible. But once you do this, it becomes a Frankenstein monster and then becomes undesirable.

"You will do this" soon becomes a GO versus NO GO test and then you have a Frankenstein monster on your hands.

Let the company commander do the evaluations his way. Don't make a rigid thing out of this. It's too easy to check boxes and this gets twisted out of shape. Then it loses its potency and value as a training tool, just as ARTEP has lost its value as a training tool. ARTEP has already turned into a monster.

Don't hang them with this as you do with ARTEP. Once you start checking them off on this like you do in ARTEP, then the tail begins to wag the dog.

Keep this as far away as possible from ARTEP. It will get a test image if used in that way and that is wrong.

ARTEP is a test. This could happen here too. It would be better to make this a platoon leader's bible. Let him take it home with him, digest it, and use it as he sees fit.

This should be presented as a platoon leader's guide with none of these headings you are using that will make it a test.

The company commander really has very little time to give his platoon leaders detailed instructions like this. You need a guide geared to the platoon leader for this. This is a step in the right direction if it is issued as a guide. Do not use Task, Conditions, Standards, or Manual, because all of these mean TEST and that is bad.

You should not get too locked in on the way to do these tasks. One company commander will teach his platoon leaders differently from another company commander. Use this as a set of basics that each company commander and platoon leader can adapt to his way of doing things. In other words, don't make it rigid. Make it a guide to be adapted.

The company commander should absorb this material, then hide it. He should read it before talking to the tank platoon leader. The material should be in the company commander's head. It should not be in the form of a checklist or even in the form in which it is now. If it is, then the company commander will start checking things off immediately. Then you, as a platoon leader, try to please your company commander and pass his checkoff test. This all leads to beating the system. That is no way to train tank platoon leaders for combat.

In discussing the attributes of a skillful tank platoon leader, the second AOAC group also commented on the necessity for the leader to maintain his coolness under the work load and stress that an NTC exercise situation demands. For example:

You have to learn to be calm when things go berserk at NTC. Luckily, I had a good platoon sergeant that trained me. The company commander should do this training, not the platoon sergeant.

You have to be able to handle stress and have common sense.

If a guy has common sense, he can usually cover his mistakes. You are not just a fool all the time. Most company commanders will give you a break.

In addressing training approaches, the following comment was made by one of these AOAC students:

The professional development classes we had were really a lot of BS. We never did get to learn all the little tricks, like selecting battle position and maneuvering the platoon, that are really important. There should be a tank platoon leaders' forum. Battalion has an obligation to do this for its platoon leaders.

The officer instructor group acknowledged that the training information portrayed by O'Brien and Drucker was useful in a limited way. For example:

It's better than Task, Conditions, and Standards which you can't fit into everything. In that regard it is better. To be honest, I never liked that approach anyway.

As a trainer's aid, it is well organized. It would be nice to have on my desk as review material. But I already have this information in other forms.

Nothing technically incorrect here. The question is, should you require the tank platoon leader to commit this to memory?

We do not go to the level of detail you show on these sheets. But we do train the lieutenant to take charge of his platoon, to control it, to maneuver it, and not be afraid.

There are too many principles here and they are too detailed. When you blow this up with the other 33 tasks, this is too much for the average guy to grasp.

The tank platoon leader's thought processes should be automatic and intuitive. You cannot spell them out in this fine detail.

The officer instructors also valued ARTEP as a basic reference. For example:

The task definitions for the platoon leader are best gotten through ARTEP. That is the standard by which we train them.

The company commander group likewise acknowledged that the O'Brien-Drucker material was useful. For example:

The meat of the stuff looks pretty useful.

Would be useful in an after-action review.

This is a step in the right direction, but as a guide.

Seriously, the stuff in here is pretty good. I could train my tank platoon leaders with this.

For brand new lieutenants, this is useful. If I had this as a basic course in my first unit, I could have used this. I know I could use this now to teach my lieutenants in a basic course.

This part about the decision principles is probably taking a giant step in the right direction by explaining the lieutenant's thought processes. You are getting toward the part that may be valuable.

This can be used at the unit level for training, but it is a duplication. It can be used as a basic tactics course for new lieutenants. Would be fine there, as there are things the new lieutenant needs to be aware of.

The company commanders questioned certain aspects of the O'Brien-Drucker material, as reflected in the following comments:

This stuff looks pretty complicated.

Simpler wording would be better for a new lieutenant.

Effective enemy fire may mean something to a guy who has been through a lot of it, but a new tank platoon leader will not know what this means. Most company commanders don't know what this means.

It does hit on a lot of key points, but even though it is very detailed it does not go into sufficient depth where this is needed.

The company commander cannot go into these details with the tank platoon leader. You have to teach him when to make exceptions. My platoon leaders have to be tuned to my ideas as a company commander. This will be different for another company commander.

How does he make the decisions? I agree with the idea of looking at the tank platoon leader's decision process, but the format here is not conducive to this. They tried to do it here and they fell short.

METTTS (mission, enemy, troops, terrain/weather, time, space) is better than the decision principles you have here and we don't really know what METTTS means.

For a basic lieutenant this would be a great introduction to tactics. The new lieutenant can get some ideas to look at from this and that's fine and dandy. But once he gets past the basics, forget it. I don't see this for line unit use. As a line unit commander, I don't have time for this.

Yes, I can teach off of this. But I could not remember all this. If I asked them to remember this, I would insult their intelligence. This reminds me of the Dick and Jane series for teaching kids to read. Or a manual explaining in great detail how to use toilet paper.

This thing overwhelms you, especially when you consider that there are 34 tasks like this to consider. I don't even want to look at all that.

If I am going to teach this stuff, I will use FM 71-1 rather than this. Secondly, I would rely on my experience as a tank platoon leader. Thirdly, I would rely on the intelligence and aptitude of the tank platoon leader I am training. Finally, I would write my own lesson plan outline based on all of these.

This is too much lock-step training. The new lieutenant knows very little about tactics. He is going to take this all down because he is impressionable. Then you take this away from him and put him in a tank under fire, he will fall completely apart. He will not be properly responsive to the situation because what he really needs is common sense and initiative.

Don't see any help here. I would not use this. Different format, but the same old material. This takes too much time and time is too precious. I already have this material and adding this to what I have uses up my time. I'd rather see the money spent on fuel, ammunition, etc.

The company commanders likewise stressed the importance of maturity, common sense, and experience as the keys to tactical success. They felt that these attributes were especially important in navigating a tank platoon to use terrain properly, in directing fire, and in commanding and controlling the platoon under a heavy load of stressful conditions such as those experienced at NTC. Here are illustrative comments:

The most important thing at NTC is common sense. You can't put that down in a book. All these tactical manuals are just guidelines.

Too many new tank platoon leaders soon lose most of the basic tactics knowledge that they have learned or it becomes outdated. That is a major problem in the Army. That's why they goof up when they go to a place like NTC.

Summary of Training Implications. Generally speaking, the training implications brought out in the interviews addressed the following issues:

- o Is it possible to separate the tank platoon leader from the platoon as a whole for the purpose of training and evaluation? Just about all of the respondents questioned whether this could be done except possibly for isolated action-type tasks.
- o What purpose is served in decomposing tactical tasks into components containing numerous detailed elements, i.e., tactical leadership activities and thought processes? The major purpose, as viewed by the respondents, appears to be one concerned with study, diagnosis, and remediation of deficiencies in tactical thought processes.
- o Can global attributes of a successful tank platoon leader, such as maturity, common sense, and experience, be logically connected to detailed tactical leadership activities and thought processes or is there an elusive gap in this connection that defies analysis? One can, with the help of data gleaned from the focus group interviews conducted in this study, posit some type of superstructure that logically connects the global attributes with the behavioral details. Such a structure was briefly described in the discussion of training implications in the research report for this project. Only further research devoted to this topic can ascertain whether this can genuinely be done in a manner that will enhance the tactical training of tank platoon leaders.
- o Should tank platoon leaders be charged with mastering (memorizing?) a large number of detailed tactical leadership activities and related thought processes? Almost all of the respondents felt that in the form of a memory test or a checklist such a requirement appears to have self-defeating tendencies. However, as a flexible study aid or guide adapted to the needs of the individual tank platoon leader and his company commander, this detail does appear to have a potential.
- o Should the tank platoon leader be trained to execute the detailed tactical leadership activities and thought processes in a prescribed (predictable) manner? The answer to this question is not as obvious as it may appear on the surface. A number of interview participants saw the need for a certain degree of predictability on the part of the tank platoon leaders. Army doctrine tends to be pointed in this direction. Yet, American tankers in particular take great pride in their ability to exercise ingenuity as witnessed in numerous U.S. tank battles in Europe during World War II.
- o Can fine-grain tactical leadership activity and thought process analysis, such as that performed by O'Brien and Drucker, be used effectively in diagnosis and remediation of tactical mission failure attributable to tank platoon leaders? The answer to this question appears to be a resounding yes, if we use as our basis the numerous comments made by the interview participants. However, this yes must still be qualified, to some degree at least, by the fact that a number of the study participants failed to see the virtues of a detailed, paper-oriented approach to such diagnosis and remediation.

- o How is fine-grain combat leadership activity and thought process training best accomplished (assimilated) by tank platoon leaders?

- Actual combat
- NTC-type training
- Observation of NTC-type exercises
- ARTEP exercises and manuals
- AOB tactics courses
- AOAC tactics courses
- Terrain boards/walks/jeeps/bicycles
- Tactical doctrine manuals
- Tactical leadership handbooks
- Platoon leader study guides
- Computerized teaching machines/simulators
- By the platoon leader himself
- Through his company commander
- Through his platoon sergeant

The answer to this question is not an easy one to come by because many different factors are involved. The interview respondents at one time or another indicated that all of the above alternatives were possible solutions. A relative cost versus effectiveness analysis would be helpful in this context.

Post-Interview Ratings

After the Phase I interviews, each participant was asked to assign a letter grade summarizing his/her reactions to the O'Brien-Drucker methodology. The ratings are shown in Table 1. The respondents were encouraged to give separate ratings for format and content, but were not forced to do so. Some gave only general ratings or format ratings. No ratings were obtained for one of the groups due to time limitations. Several participants had to leave the interview due to other commitments and did not complete the ratings.

As shown in Table 1, the ratings tend to vary within and across the groups. The groups are rank ordered approximately on the basis of the composite letter grades their members assigned to the methodology. Table 1 also shows the letter grade ratings assigned by interview observers to reflect their estimates of each group's reaction to the methodology. The observers included two moderators who directed the interviews. They made their ratings at the conclusion of each interview. In addition, a data analyst submitted ratings for each group based only on listening to the interview recordings. The observer ratings are also rank ordered approximately on the basis of the letter composites assigned.

A visual comparison of the approximate ranks for the two sets of rating groups suggests that reasonably close agreement occurred in the letter grade assignments. However, the between group differences in rank order need to be cautiously interpreted. These differences could merely be reflecting the fact that some of the participants were more critical in the way they viewed training procedures in general and new approaches like that of O'Brien and Drucker in particular.

Table 1
Post-Interview Ratings

Group	N	Interviewee ratings	Approximate rank	Observer ratings	Approximate rank
Infantry platoon leaders	4	Format: A, A, B, C Content: B, B, B+,A	1.5	Format: A, B, B Content: A, B-,A-	1.5
NCO instructors	6	General: A-,B+,B, B, B,B-	1.5	Format: A, B, A- Content: A, B-,B	1.5
Tank platoon leaders	4	General: A, B, B, F	3.0	Format: B-,A, C Content: A, B, B-	3.0
AOAC Group 7	4	Format: B+,B, -, - Content: C, C-, -, - General: -, -, C, C-	4.5	Format: A, B, B- Content: C, C, C	4.0
AOAC Group 6	6	Format: C+,C, C, C-,D,D Content: B, B, C, B, B,C	4.5	Format: D, -, C- Content: B, -, B-	5.0
Officer instructors		(no interviewee ratings)	-	Format: D, B-,D- Content: D, B-,D-	6.0
Company commanders	9	Format: -, -, F, F,F Content: -, -, A General: A-,B, -, C, -, -,F,F,F	6.0	Format: F, F, F Content: D, C-,D	7.0

Group Backgrounds

Group characteristics were compiled from a background questionnaire completed by each focus group participant. Several characteristics appear to have a vague relationship to the rank-orderings appearing in Table 1. These are:

- o Year graduated from officer's basic course
- o Current duty assignment
- o Pay grade (rank)
- o Total length of Army service
- o Command officer experience

This suggests that participants relatively new to the Army, recently graduated from officer basic school, intimately engaged in platoon operations on a daily basis, having a relatively low rank, and lacking in senior command experience tended to be more enthusiastic concerning the fine-grain tactical leadership and thought process emphasis in the O'Brien-Drucker format. These participants tended to appreciate the spelling out of tactical leadership details perhaps because they felt a stronger need for this detail at the level of command in which they currently operate.

It would be interesting to follow these participants in their careers to see if their enthusiasm for the fine-grain details of tactical training is sustained as they assume greater command responsibilities.

The other eight characteristics in the questionnaire did not appear to bear any visible relationship to the rank-orders described in Table 1. These characteristics are:

- o Staff officer experience
- o NCO experience
- o Army branch
- o Source of commission
- o Primary Military Occupational Specialty (MOS)
- o Number of tank gunnery cycles experienced
- o Total assignments within major commands
- o Number of major training exercises experienced

The lack of apparent relationship for the last characteristic on the list may be somewhat surprising. However, this can be explained by the fact that the more enthusiastic participants not only tended to have the characteristics described above, but also had relatively low exposure to major training exercises.

PHASE II INTERVIEW FINDINGS

Detailed findings for the Phase II interviews are presented here. The findings basically address three primary topical categories concerning the O'Brien-Drucker methodology and potential extensions thereof. The categories all involve the tactical training and evaluation of tank platoon leaders. They are (1) training objectives, (2) standards development, and (3) evaluation resources.

Training Objectives

Initial emphasis in the Phase II focus group interviews was given to the topic of training objectives for tank platoon leaders. The discussion of training objectives was used to obtain follow-up data on this topic in order to augment the information collected in the Phase I interviews. It also served as an entree to the subsequent topics concerning standards development and evaluation resource requirements.

The officer instructors described what they believed the function of tactical training objectives for tank platoon leaders should be in the following example:

Tactical training objectives should function to highlight and emphasize those actions that the tank platoon leader should take under the stress of combat and do in an instinctive fashion. The actions should be second nature to him.

This group was impressed by the tactical training objectives prepared by O'Brien and Drucker as evidenced by the following comment.

Somebody did a good job of analysis here. The analysis is great. I find it interesting.

However, they took issue with the level of detail portrayed in the description. For example:

We do not have the time to teach the lieutenant to this depth or this much detail. Passing this on to a lieutenant is not possible. I don't see a teaching use for anything this long and detailed. Lesson plans can't be anywhere near this length.

Don't expect him to memorize this. Use it as something to refer to before going out to the field.

The officer instructors felt that organization of the detailed training objectives into higher-order principles was necessary before it could be assimilated effectively. This is illustrated in the following comments:

He's not going to be able to read this too well in getting ready for a field exercise. This is too much for him. If you can teach him basic principles, then you're ahead.

A layout of training objectives like this for 34 critical tasks will give you a lot of unnecessary repetition. If you teach him a basic principle like METTTS, then you don't have to lay this out again and again for each task. If you teach him a basic principle like action on contact, this covers things you have listed here that add to the repetition. I can see some of this detail as a way to help explain these basic principles.

In discussing the economic problems of training tank platoons, the officer instructors came up with the following comment regarding video game training.

If we have economic problems in training our tank platoons, let's not put the platoon leader into a video game environment. There are better ways to teach him if you can't use tanks, fuel, ammunition, etc. The Germans effectively trained their tankers on bicycles prior to World War II.

Like other groups, the officer instructors observed flaws in the content of the training objectives. For example:

There's a technical flaw in the decision component where it says conduct fire and movement when all of the following conditions are present. The all statement is inappropriate.

Why are the TOWs (tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-command linked guided missile system) tasks in the critical task list? That is the company commander's job and not the tank platoon leader's.

The first group of AOAC students (Group 9) described tactical training objectives as follows:

Tactical training objectives are those desired outcomes that the tank platoon leader will need to achieve in order to insure that he and his platoon will exist as an effective fighting force in battle.

I think that's the right answer. We want to engrain in him a thought process which is going to encompass all those outcomes.

These AOAC students were very impressed with the potential the O'Brien-Drucker material has for stimulating tactical thought processes. For example:

Once you get him stimulated to the point of thinking and not just doing his job, he's becoming a good combat leader. This to me would be an effective tool to stimulate not only the platoon leader but the company commander.

The important thing is what did he think about when he was doing it, not what he actually did. This is where this helps in handling the situation as a thought process.

That's why I liked this right from the start. It gets away from the checklist and into the thinking processes.

This would be a good study guide for the platoon leader. Helps him to think, "When I make this decision, I should take such and such into consideration."

This is a good thing for a young platoon leader to go through and read. I know as a company commander that I'd like to have this myself. It would be more effective if the company commander were to use it to go through various thought processes with his tank platoon leaders.

I do like it in a way. It gives you pretty much task-conditions-standards, but it goes into a description of what factors you should consider in making your decision.

I could see a good use for this. There's not really a manual that's addressed to the tank platoon leader that puts it all together like this. If this was something that would take the place of other manuals instead of adding to them, I think that would be a pretty good idea.

It should be given to them as soon as they hit AOB, then used throughout AOB as a reference. The thing I like about the format is the logic. It lays everything out. For somebody new in this profession, this is a very good thing for them to start out with and refer back to.

These AOAC students also voiced an number of concerns and limitations regarding the training objectives. For example:

This would be great to just have around. But we're leery of these things. We've been burnt too many times. They don't want to hear what your thought processes were. Most of the time they just want to know whether you did it or not.

The platoon leader is never given enough time to work with his platoon. Every time I took my platoon to the field it was not to be trained but to be tested.

This should be circulated to the company commander. I don't think the company commander takes a big enough part in training the platoon leader like he should. It's kind of like the platoon sergeant helps out and the lieutenant becomes a platoon leader by osmosis.

I can't emphasize how many duds we have as company commanders. They just do not train their platoons.

I can't see this as a panacea. If the company commander doesn't teach this, it won't get done.

If you look at this as a machine, then all the parts are there. But you must be careful not to give the impression that this is all there is to it. This possibly gives you a false feeling of completeness because of the detail it goes into.

This group also felt that an effort should be made to organize the training objective details into a higher-order set of principles. Their comments on this topic were as follows:

There is a pitfall here for the platoon leader to study these details straight as given and not be able to understand the basic principles involved like METTTS, action on contact, troop-leading procedures, movement procedures, principles of attack. These principles apply to many situations like this. I think it's better to work out from basic principles.

Thirty-four are a lot of critical tasks. But most of them are pretty essential. You should reduce the bulk in this material by finding things that are common across the tasks. Condense it down to basic principles that apply to everything. As it stands now, it is totally impractical to use.

This group also addressed flaws in the content. For example:

You need to put mission consideration into the fire and movement task. It doesn't address the mission at all.

ARTEP had a prominent place in most of the participants' discussions. Here are examples of two viewpoints expressed in this AOAC group:

I would like this kind of thing to replace ARTEP. Right now you read ARTEP, then you have to go to other manuals to see what it is you are supposed to do.

This should not take the place of ARTEP. This gives you a good guideline to go back and say, "Well, what was your thought process in getting to that conclusion?"

The training developers expressed their viewpoint of what tactical training objectives for the tank platoon leader should be in the following comments:

We want the platoon leader to develop an intuitive ability to react in various battlefield situations.

You can't have a training objective without a standard. If you don't have a clear-cut standard, then everybody does it their own way.

This is not what we would call a training objective because it doesn't structure the training environment as we normally do. There's nothing wrong with this. The hang-up is in

calling it a training objective when it hasn't been laundered for training.

They used doctrine manuals to write training objectives. They should use training manuals to write training objectives. Doctrine is just an example of what you should do. It's a general guideline. But it's not the way to do it which is what the training manuals cover.

The best way to come up with training objectives is:
(1) develop a tentative list based on your own experience,
(2) examine various references to see if there is a cross-walk, (3) survey AOAC students, and (4) go to Europe, Korea, Conus and query company commanders, platoon leaders, and platoon sergeants. By doing that you can perhaps please the vast majority, but you certainly are not going to please them all.

Concerning the utility of the fine-grain detail in the training objectives prepared by O'Brien and Drucker, the training developers had these comments:

The level of detail here will make a thicker manual than ARTEP 71-2. You are giving the platoon leader too much information to handle.

The platoon leader doesn't need all this stuff about what he needs to think about. Just give him the task and the task description. That's all he really needs. Cut the rest off.

We're not talking about totally removing it from him when he goes to the field. It should always be available so he can go back and study it. It's the company commander's job to bring him back to this level of detail if necessary.

This is too detailed for the company commander and is not in the correct format for him. He is not used to reading this kind of material. The platoon leader is also not used to reading this.

There are ingredients here that would help a platoon leader to use his thought processes. But I gotta emphasize that it has to be at the basic level or installation phase. Once he gets out in the field, he doesn't need all this. Just give him his mission and let him make his decisions.

The training developers commented at some length on the flaws they observed in the content of the training objectives. For example:

For the platoon leader and company commander to use this you would need to restructure it and put it into a language that they understand.

As a training developer, I could use a lot of this stuff. But a lot of it I would throw in the garbage can. If it was corrected and updated, I would want to have all of this for my disposition.

These flaws emphasize what I said before about the need to develop training objectives from a factual analytical job base. There, you have to satisfy the experts that all the glitches are removed before you go on to outputting the training objectives.

Everybody has different ideas on what "obscuration" is or what "effective direct, indirect, or suppressive fire" is. These are measurable, but not the way they are now written up.

The TOW tasks are not platoon leader tasks. That's up to the company commander.

The training developers also voiced a substantial number of technical corrections to the content. The following comment summarizes their reaction to these flaws:

Much of this stuff should be rewritten. Many of the details shown there are not correct or realistic.

To sum up, the training developers felt that: (1) the O'Brien-Drucker format and content is basically OK, but needs a more visible job analysis data base to allow training experts to remove the many glitches in the content, (2) for the platoon leader, it's good as a basic introductory resource, guide, or reference, and (3) it is not too good for field use because it is too detailed to the point of being overwhelming and, as it stands now, it discourages the platoon leader's maturation into higher-order thought processes and principles.

The NCO instructors recognized the value of the training objectives but felt obliged to make qualifications, as seen in the following comments:

You can get some good information out of here for a platoon leader as well as a platoon sergeant and tank commander.

The platoon leader ain't going to be doing half this stuff. The platoon sergeant will be doing most of it. The platoon leader's too busy to do all this stuff.

In preparing for an ARTEP, this could give the platoon leader a list of things he's got to cover. But he won't need this after awhile when he gets the experience.

To get such pinpoint detail on this just doesn't make sense because it will never be carried out that way to begin with. Every platoon leader is going to think differently anyway.

I wouldn't draw it out like this. You're trying to cover a lot of different points and you're repeating yourself along the way.

It's true what they say here. I think it's pretty well broken down. But it's not organized properly. At least a quarter of this is turned around topsy-turvy.

The NCO instructors also picked up on the flaws in the content. For example:

The decision principles for the fire and movement task should be junked and rewritten.

Under the decision component, those are not the conditions that affect intraplatoon control. The three things are smoke, being buttoned up, and being under fire.

The second group of AOAC students (Group 12) concentrated most of their remarks on the relative utility of the O'Brien-Drucker approach while making frequent references to ARTEP. They noted limitations of the approach and suggested possible ways of improving it.

If this were sanitized, I would definitely use it as a company commander. It's between this and the ARTEP manual. Say I'm trying to develop the platoon leader as an officer and help him to grow. Then, this would be good for me to use, because I'd be on the same sheet music as every other company commander in the Army. And the NCOs would be helping him out too, because they would have the same thing as I have to refer to.

From the company commander's viewpoint, I can see this used on map exercises, TEWTs (tactical exercise without troops) and terrain boards. You give him a mission, then ask him, "What are you going to do? What are you thinking about?"

Theoretically, this would be an excellent aid for the company commander in training his platoon leaders. In reality, he does not have enough time to actually do these things with his platoon leaders. It's almost every time you go out, it's a test of some sort.

The company commander is not going to go through all this stuff. He is going to wait to see what the platoon leader needs help on. In other words, the initial pressure and responsibility for learning this stuff falls on the platoon leader.

Unfortunately, too often the company commander is not in a position to be the trainer that he actually should be. He's got too many things to do. If you look back when you were a platoon leader and count the number of times your

commander actually watched you maneuver a platoon, you could count the number of times on one hand.

There are times I wish I could have remembered all these things here. I probably would have been a whole lot better platoon leader. This command task we are looking at has got all of the things I can think of for what a platoon leader needs to know to direct fire and movement. Yea, he's got to think about all those things. A lot of time we never thought about them, partly because we didn't have any idea of what they were. I don't think we were even trained to think about some of them.

You're going to have to have this in your mind before you go out to the field. But I can see this. It provides a lot of information; you know, the old "let's think about what's going on" routine.

It's very detailed and it's something the platoon leader needs to know and needs to follow. Unfortunately, many of them will use this as a tactical crutch in the field.

I saw new platoon leaders at Hood bury themselves in a lot of little handouts and other garbage they had gotten hold of. Then, they'd lose control of their platoons almost from the start because they had their heads buried in those things.

With this decision-making stuff, I think everybody is saying, "It's got to come naturally or you're going to get blown away."

It doesn't put confidence in your troops if you've got to pull out a little book to make a decision out in the field. They want things to come out of your head.

I agree that this would be a good resource to have for 34 critical tasks that will help make you tactically proficient. Things are right there for you to look at. You don't have to go to this manual or that manual in order to pull all that stuff out.

It may be helpful in some ways. ARTEP pretty much covers this stuff. However, the ARTEP manual doesn't go into the "hows" as much as this does.

I don't think this can stand on its own. But it would be a good supplement.

I think this could be used in a computer simulation before going out in the field. It would help the lieutenant to gain more confidence in reacting to various situations.

Another idea would be to take this stuff and bring it all together into a platoon leader's manual. Everything he has to know from the FMs and all that other stuff could be contained in the manual. And please don't just make this another checklist.

These AOAC students also expressed a strong sentiment for organizing the detailed content into higher-order principles. For example:

I like this thing if it doesn't get too lengthy. As an example, there's the METTTS principle. You've got this broken down so many times and you keep repeating it. By the time you do this for 34 tasks, you're going to be repeating METTTS over and over and over again. After awhile nobody will even want to read that.

For me, what this does is it expounds on METTTS. If you understand METTTS, then you don't need this. We might as well use the ARTEP manual as this because it tells us almost the same thing.

Taking almost everything you have on the command-task format is like asking, "Did the platoon leader properly evaluate the factors of METTTS?"

I can use the task description, the ARTEP tie-ins, and some of the command and execution components. For the decision component all you need to put down is METTTS. I don't know how much of this other stuff we really need. By the time we were done with shortening this, we would have a small piece of paper for each critical task that tells us basically the same thing as you have here.

Standards Development

The focus group moderators experienced some difficulty in pursuing the topic of standards development oriented specifically to the tactical training of tank platoon leaders. This was probably due to a variety of reasons including: (1) the dynamic nature of tactical performance, (2) the fact that ARTEP enjoys an established role as an accepted platoon evaluation device, and (3) certain qualms that respondents had about the pitfalls of fixed, fine-grain detail evaluation.

The officer instructors described the following orientation to evaluation:

There are basically two ways to evaluate a platoon leader to a tactical standard. For example, in teaching the principle of action on contact, you have him write down all the things he must do. Then you evaluate him on that. Or, you put him in a platoon under stress and watch what the platoon does. You really won't know if he can do these things correctly until you see the platoon perform correctly, because you can't evaluate his mental processes.

They felt that the O'Brien-Drucker material was useful in diagnostic evaluation, but presented problems in the field due to the level of detail at which it is pitched. For example:

This material can be useful in feedback to the platoon leader when he fails to accomplish the mission. You can use the decision and execution components as aids in asking the lieutenant what his thought processes were in coming up with the decisions that he did come up with.

Yes, I think this would be helpful and meaningful, but this level of detail is rarely ever used in the field. If you did this during an ARTEP, you would completely overload the evaluator.

I don't see the evaluation of 34 critical tasks like this as being possible. You just don't have the time. There should be a priority scheme, but it should not be fixed. The company commander is the one who determines what the priority should be. You might give the company commander some estimates of what it takes to evaluate each task.

On the specific topic of standards, the officer instructors felt that the platoon ARTEP was the proper recourse for evaluation, but they did allow as how certain parts of the O'Brien-Drucker format might lend themselves to standards development. For example:

For standards just go to the ARTEP manual. It tells you all you need to evaluate. If I want to evaluate a platoon leader, I would use the same criteria as those in ARTEP.

The standard for a command-type task should be the platoon ARTEP. You can't really evaluate a platoon leader on this type of task without his platoon. On the action-type task you can probably evaluate him in a classroom or on a terrain board.

The action component on the action task tells you what to look for in the way of performance measures and standards. You can hear him give that frag order. You wouldn't need to go off this sheet or check with ARTEP on that task.

The command component of the command task looks like it has the beginnings of a standard if you add a time factor to it. The execution principles looks like it might support the command component in deriving performance steps. However, it changes when the situation changes. ARTEP should be checked to make sure everything is consistent.

Most of the decision and execution components can't be directly evaluated because they concern things that go on in a guy's mind in seconds.

The first group of AOAC students (Group 9) also felt that for command-type evaluation the tank platoon leader is an inseparable part of the platoon. Their comments on this were as follows:

I had heartburn in the beginning when you said to draw a circle around the platoon leader. I don't see how you can do that. It's your platoon and you're responsible for everything it does.

You can't isolate the platoon leader during the exercise. You've gotta evaluate the whole platoon.

The important thing is what the platoon does. If the platoon passes, that's all you need to know. If it fails, only then do you want to get down to the nitty-gritty level of why they failed.

Like many other participants, these AOAC students tended to go to ARTEP when the topic of evaluation was raised. For example:

This would be a pretty decent guide for informal training of my platoon leaders. But I think ARTEP is really as far as we need to go in formal evaluation.

I think it would aid the platoon leader in studying to become more proficient in these tasks. But I don't think it should replace ARTEP or be used for grading performance. The ARTEP is fine for that.

In an ARTEP I really didn't know half of what I was supposed to, but they went down that checklist and said, "You goofed up on this or that." That turned me off. I mean it didn't teach me much.

This group saw value in the O'Brien-Drucker methodology, but hesitated noticeably when it came to specific ways to extend the approach to encompass standards. For example:

This would be good to go through and say, "Well, you goofed up here lieutenant and let's figure out what went wrong." This would be a great after-action review or critique format.

This is great. If I had this, I would train him to do this and my standards would just be a concise summation of putting all these things together.

This is a great guide. I wouldn't mind having it, but I don't think that you can hold the platoon leader to it in a graded exercise. But I would train him by using it as a guide.

Kind of scares me when you ask for standards. You can have a list three miles long. I would prefer to leave it as it

is, then go back after the exercise and discuss the thought processes with the lieutenant. It's hard to judge by a list of standards. That is one thing I hate about ARTEP. Everybody is so worried about filling in that checklist.

I think you'd better leave the standards off this. If you put standards on this, it will stop being used as a training tool and become just a test.

For standards, just summarize the key points from each of these sections in the format. That right there would create an AAR (after-action review) discussion as far as saying, "How did you come up with that decision?" This in itself to me personally is great.

We're suspicious that this is going to wind up just like an SQT (Skill Qualification Test) or ARTEP, that is, a checklist of standards without any concern for the thought processes involved.

Those execution principles in Section VII will bring out "Did he do or not do what he was supposed to?" and his thought processes while doing it.

The training developers likewise stressed the inseparability of the platoon leader from the tank platoon in evaluating performance with comments such as the following:

You can't separate the platoon leader from his platoon in the field, especially for the command tasks. Maybe the action-type task he can do in isolation.

The way you tell a platoon leader how effective he is is how effective his platoon is. You can't realistically separate him from his platoon.

Only way you can grade the platoon leader is to find out, "Did the platoon move appropriately?" You don't know what's in his mind and there's no way to measure that. But you can determine if everybody in the platoon got the right signal from him, regardless of how he gave it.

It is easy to take something like a frag order task and develop some sequential performance steps and standards that he must do. But when you try to do it for something like fire and movement, it is very difficult. For these, I don't think you can develop a standard the way most people define a standard.

In discussing standards, ARTEP and Military Qualification Standard (MQS) occupied a prominent place in the viewpoints of the training developers. For example:

We've had standards like these in ARTEP for many years. Problem is nobody knows how to use the ARTEP the way it's supposed to be used.

What is currently in the standard column of ARTEP is not really a standard. Those are performance measures.

ARTEP has become a test of efficiency and has lost its meaning as a training tool. The same thing would happen with this thing.

The MQS is basically a soldier's manual for the tank platoon leader. It's a good checklist of performance measures and other references you need to look for in evaluating a platoon leader.

The big problem with the MQS is the standards on it. It's a checklist type and there are no measurable standards on it.

In the MQS, they didn't go into a depth analysis like this as far as the decision-flow process for the platoon leader.

But you don't really need a lot of this information. It goes into too much detail.

The training developers felt there were possibilities in the O'Brien-Drucker material for standards development, but these possibilities would have to be brought out through additional work on the material. For example:

Yea, I could develop standards from this sheet. But I would have to take what's here and check back through ARTEP and the doctrine manuals. Then, I would need to finish this product by getting information from company commanders, platoon leaders, and platoon sergeants on what the time constraints really are.

If the execution principles were cleaned up and corrected, that's probably as close to a standard on this sheet as I've seen.

The command component of the action task is one where you can watch the tank platoon leader. In that sense, it lends itself to an observable standard.

The decision principles are more like conditions. They really have no applicability to this task as far as the decisions to be made are concerned.

Assuming that all the flaws are corrected, this could have a useful impact on what we do in insuring that, in our task analysis, we have in fact covered everything that's possible. We did not consider all these things to the extent that

they are considered here when we wrote material for TC 17-15-1.

There are two important things in addressing tactical standards. (1) Was the task successfully accomplished? That's a standard and typically the only one that you have time to use in a field exercise. (2) If not successfully accomplished, why? That's all those detailed diagnostic things you have here. These are like performance measures or steps.

The NCO instructors likewise stressed the fact of inseparability of platoon leader and platoon during evaluation. For example:

You are talking about the platoon leader when you talk about the platoon.

Concerning the usefulness of the O'Brien-Drucker material as a means for providing feedback to the tank platoon leader, the following comments were made in this group:

It should be useful in feedback. It will make him improve himself in situations like this. It will help him if he wants to better himself.

Standards developed from this material should be in the platoon leaders' SQT book.

On the topic of how much detail is appropriate in evaluation, the NCO instructors had this to say:

You don't need to write down every detail, only in certain cases. If they are top-notch, you won't get into as much detail as if they're really ragged.

I'd say the training itself should be more in detail like this, but when it comes to evaluating the task you should be more general.

The NCO instructors tended to be enthusiastic concerning the development of standards from the O'Brien-Drucker materials. They had the following comments to make on this topic:

Once we cleaned this up and combined sections, we could have a standards section. We could then evaluate the platoon leader on each task.

I think the decision principles can be related as standards. But those you have there for the fire and movement task are unrealistic. They should be cleaned up and combined with the execution principles.

On the command task, start with the execution principles. Clean them up and get them up-to-date with the latest

doctrine. Rewrite them to tell the platoon leader how we want the task to be performed. Then just add the task, the task description, and the conditions requiring fire and movement. Then add some time measures wherever you can. Everything else down there you don't need for standards. They will understand this a lot better than what you have there now.

The second group of AOAC students (Group 12) also emphasized the unity of the platoon and the platoon leader. For example:

You've got to consider the platoon as the body and the platoon leader as the head and you can't have one without the other.

It's really hard to look at just the platoon leader without thinking about the rest of the platoon.

You just watch the platoon. If they are doing the right thing, then he is getting the right signal to them somehow. You don't care how he does that. When a platoon works together for awhile their signals may become subtle.

So often your platoon sergeant or tank commanders will do things that you don't tell them to do. This may help you or it may hurt you. But based on what they do, you get evaluated.

With the command task, the only way to really evaluate the platoon leader is by how the platoon does. With the action task, the platoon leader has to do some very specific things by himself and you can objectively look and say he did this or did that.

Like other participants, these AOAC students commented on the difficulty of evaluating detailed decision processes. For example:

This whole command task you have here is done in seconds. How can anyone evaluate what's in your mind. It's just a mental process that's got to be done that quick.

This group also referred to the role of the company commander with regard to standards in making the following comment:

I think company commanders really care only whether it gets done, not how it gets done. When you're talking about standards, you're talking about how it gets done.

These AOAC students also made comments concerning how the O'Brien-Drucker material could be converted to standards. For example:

I think these guys have done it pretty well. Those execution principles down at the bottom of the page basically say it. If he did those things, then he met the standards.

The execution principles kind of give you some idea of what the platoon leader should do. You could look at that as a standard.

They're trying to make the decision principles look like a standard, but who is to say what words like "available" and "sufficient" mean. Those words are subjective and mean different things to different people.

You could write a question under each of the component sections and ask, "Did he do that?" That could be your standards.

This group of AOAC students voiced concerns, like other participants, regarding the possible abuses of the O'Brien-Drucker material in standards development. For example:

What scares me about this is that just as soon as it gets published somebody will come up with the idea to put little scoring blocks on it. Then the company commanders and platoon leaders will be going around checking these blocks. I hate the thought of that.

I don't know if I want to put blocks on a piece of paper like this. That would be fine for me telling the platoon leader about something he forgot to consider. But I think it would end up going beyond that and that's what scares me the most.

Instead of giving him so many points on a checklist, just say simply that he followed doctrine and effectively got to the objective, therefore, he can do the task. I can't see setting up any kind of grading method on this.

It's not so much the word standard that's the problem. It's basically the idea of making a hard and fast list of things you are going to call standards. To me there's just one true standard. Did he successfully accomplish the task?

Resource Requirements for Evaluation

The participants had a number of things to say concerning the resource requirements for gathering data to evaluate a tank platoon leader during a field exercise.

The officer instructors had this to say:

For resources, you basically need a qualified evaluator, a note pad, and a pencil. A platoon of tanks is desirable, but they could be jeeps or bicycles if necessary.

The first group of AOAC students (Group 9) expanded on the evaluation resource requirements with the following comment, starting with the O'Brien-Drucker material as a point of departure.

For evaluation this would be helpful. Ideally, you'd need to do it with MILES (Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System), full TOE (table of organization and equipment), and a real live threat. You also need time to go through the troop-leading procedures, to stand down and critique the exercise, and allow time for retraining. Then you'd need two evaluators, one on the platoon leader's tank and one on the platoon sergeant's tank to see how much the sergeant is doing that the platoon leader should be involved in. You could also use another evaluator at the point of OPFOR (opposing force) contact. In addition, binoculars and a voice recorder would be desirable along with a hookup into the radio circuits. Pyrotechnics is also nice to have. This is optimal. You could do it with a lot less, e.g., (1) evaluator and notebook, (2) map boards, terrain walks, bicycles, jeeps instead of tanks.

The training developers, in discussing evaluation resource requirements, pretty much reiterated the items listed above by the first group of AOAC students. They did, however, add the following comment:

Whether or not you need a full-up tank platoon, etc. in order to evaluate the platoon leader depends on the specific task you are evaluating.

The NCO instructors added to the preceding list of items the following comments:

Also you need maintenance, refueling, rations, and medical support. And you need a training area and transportation for the controllers and evaluators. If MILES is not available, you need pyrotechnics.

The evaluator needs an evaluation schedule. It's much cheaper to give him pads and pencils rather than expensive recording equipment.

The least amount you would need beside an evaluator is a terrain board. This eliminates the tanks.

The NCO instructors felt that, with proper development, a computer might be useful in training and evaluating a platoon leader. They made the following comments in this regard:

I think it would be worthwhile to use something like CAMMS (Computer-Assisted Map Maneuver System) at the platoon level. Originally, it was programmed at the brigade level and is now at the battalion level. It could be programmed at the platoon level.

That (CAMMS) would be pretty neat.

The second group of AOAC students (Group 12) listed evaluation resources similar to those shown for the first group of AOAC students. They added the following comment:

Would like a company commander with line experience doing the evaluation. Would want him on my tank, maybe in the loader's hatch. Although his presence is disrupting, he needs to be on my tank to do his job properly. At some time, I would like him to be on one of the other tanks in my platoon so he can see how my orders are taken, i.e., "Do they laugh at my attempts to lead the platoon?" It's also nice for the evaluator to be in a number of different locations so he can observe the platoon from outside the tanks.

In discussing feedback needs, they made the following comments:

The feedback should be as soon as convenient and it should be in a place where the platoon leader can listen and pay attention. The evaluator's notes should bring out things that are fresh in the platoon leader's mind.

If you had a small recap sheet on each critical task here, that would be a handy device to use. But there is no way you want to mark standards boxes on all of this and no way you want to give him any kind of score. Instead, you look at all this stuff, study it, and make notes on what you're going to evaluate. In other words, these things you have here are useful standard guidelines to evaluate the platoon leader.

(Referring to the above comment) That's a good type of standardization. Everybody's looking at the same type of thing. The guy should then get a fair evaluation.

Post-Interview Ratings

At the end of each focus group interview, each participant rated the O'Brien-Drucker methodology on the following factors relating to the tactical training and evaluation of tank platoon leaders:

1. Appropriateness of training objectives
2. Potential for standards development
3. Potential for field data collection
4. Potential for after-exercise feedback

The moderators also rated the same factors based on their estimate of how each group reacted during the interview.

The ratings are summarized in Table 2. Appearing there is a composite letter grade rating for each focus group on each of the factors described above. A composite rating for the two observers (moderators) is also shown. Each composite represents the midpoint rating after the ratings in each cell were sequenced from highest to lowest. Using similar procedures, composite factor ratings across all groups were also derived.

An examination of Table 2 indicates that both groups of AOAC students tended to give somewhat higher ratings to Factor I (appropriateness of training objectives) and Factor IV (after-exercise feedback potential). The second group of AOAC students (Group 12) also tended to give higher ratings to Factor III (field data collection potential). The NCO instructors tended to give higher ratings to Factor II (standards development potential). The officer instructors and training developers tended to rate all four factors at the C level. The composite ratings across groups indicate that the participants generally were more impressed with the potential the methodology offers in the way of training objectives and after-exercise feedback than in the way of standards development and field data collection. The observer ratings of the group reactions tended to be higher than the interviewee ratings. The ratings in Table 2 correspond reasonably well with the verbatim comments of the participant groups as described previously.

Table 2

Composite Post-Interview Ratings
of the O'Brien-Drucker Methodology

Focus group	Factor I		Factor II		Factor III		Factor IV	
	<u>Training objectives</u>		<u>Standards</u>		<u>Data collection</u>		<u>Feedback</u>	
	Partic- ipants	Observ- ers	Partic- ipants	Observ- ers	Partic- ipants	Observ- ers	Partic- ipants	Observ- ers
Officer instructors (N=6)	C	B-	C+	B-	C-	C	C+	C+
AOAC students (Group 3) (N=9)	B+	B	C	C-	D+	C+	B+	B
Training developers (N=7)	C	B	C	B	C	B-	C+	B-
NCO instructors (N=6)	C	C	B-	B-	C+	C+	C+	B-
AOAC students (Group 12) (N=6)	B	B	C-	D	B	C+	B	B
Composite across groups	B-	B	C+	B-	C	C+	B	B

Note 1: The N for observers is always equal to 2.

Note 2: The composite rating is the midpoint letter rating for each cell.

Note 3: The composite across groups is the midpoint letter rating for all groups lumped together.

Group Backgrounds

As described in the previous section, the AOAC students showed a tendency to rate the O'Brien-Drucker methodology higher than the other focus groups. To explore this trend more closely, other characteristics from the background questionnaire were examined. Several of these characteristics throw additional light on possible background factors that may have influenced the group reactions to the O'Brien-Drucker methodology. These characteristics are summarized in Table 3 along with methodology ratings for three types of focus group participants.

Table 3
Characteristics and Ratings of AOAC Students as
Compared to Other Types of Army Focus Group Participants

Variable (statistic)	AOAC students (N=15)	Other officers (N=10)	NCOs (N=7)
AOB graduation after 1978 (%)	100	0	n.a.
West Point graduate (%)	60	0	n.a.
Army service--years (Mdn)	4.3	7.2	9.8
Command experience --months (Mdn)	18	35	n.a.
Platoon sergeant/ tank commander experience --months (Mdn)	0	0	60
Gunnery cycles experienced --number (Mdn)	5	5	20
Major field exercises experienced --number (Mdn)	2	4	5
Ratings of B- or higher--Factor I (%)	100	10	14
Ratings of B- or higher--Factor II (%)	40	30	71
Ratings of B- or higher--Factor III (%)	33	20	29
Ratings of B- or higher--Factor IV (%)	87	40	57

Thus we can see, in Table 3, a trend for officers with less Army and armor experience, as well as those graduated from West Point and those with less command and major field exercise experience, to be more impressed with the O'Brien-Drucker methodology and its potential application and extension to tactical training. This trend is more apparent in Factor I (appropriateness of the methodology for describing what the tank platoon leader should be trained to do) and Factor IV (potential for improving feedback on tactical performance to the tank platoon leader after a field exercise). It is less apparent for Factor II (potential for generating specific standards for judging the tactical performance of tank platoon leaders) and Factor III (potential for providing the performance data to evaluate a tank platoon leader during a field exercise).

Another interesting aspect of Table 3 is the comparison of participant characteristics and ratings for the NCOs. These participants had the most extensive experience in the tanks per se as well as in gunnery and major field exercises. They exhibited a notable tendency to give higher ratings to Factor II (potential for generating specific standards for judging the tactical performance of tank platoon leaders).

The trends in Table 3 are consistent with the comments of the Phase I and Phase II interview participants as described previously. These findings, although not conclusive, strongly suggest that newer, less experienced armor officers (not necessarily of lower pay grade) tend to be more impressed with the potential the O'Brien-Drucker methodology offers in the way of tactical training and performance feedback. It would appear, therefore, that this methodology will tend to have greater acceptance among these types of officer personnel.

The tendency for the NCOs to feel that the O'Brien-Drucker methodology has the potential for generating specific standards for judging the tactical performance of tank platoon leaders contrasts with the frequently observed officer reaction of skepticism to such extensions. It also contrasts with the NCOs' ratings of Factor III (potential for providing performance data to evaluate a tank platoon leader during a field exercise). Perhaps from their prior experience with SQT-standards as enlisted men, the NCOs see a need for similar standards to be applied to tank platoon leaders. As a result, they tend to look favorably upon such ideas. During the focus group sessions, the NCOs did show less tendency than the other groups to comment on the potentially objectionable features of evolving standards from the O'Brien-Drucker content. On the other hand, they seemed to be more active in making specific suggestions concerning how the O'Brien-Drucker material might be extended to encompass standards. These tendencies appear to be reflected in their ratings.

SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS

On balance, the O'Brien-Drucker approach to developing training objectives was perceived as having considerable promise as a method for presenting and emphasizing training content that is inherently useful in the formative stages of tactical leadership training. A predominant theme during the interviews was the view that the approach provides basic tactical training ingredients that allow a tank platoon leader to organize his thoughts and actions for field exercises. In this perception, the content was viewed as being potentially valuable as a self-training tool and as a discussion aid to diagnosis and remediation of tactical performance deficiencies.

Other response themes observed during the interviews emphasized the need for more combat-like training and less paperwork. Paperwork in the form of ill-conceived evaluation checklists was particularly viewed as being counter-productive. Higher order abilities like common sense, maturity, and experience were typically stressed as the key attributes of a combat-ready tank platoon leader.

The platoon leader was viewed as an inseparable part of the tank platoon and also as a relatively minor force in the complex of factors that determine the success or failure of most missions. Consequently, the respondents reacted with noticeable resistance to the notion of setting standards for platoon leaders separately from the standards for platoons as a whole.

The participants had some pretty definite ideas concerning what the resource requirements for the proper tactical evaluation of and feedback to a tank platoon leader should be. Mainly these involved the approximating of combat conditions as much as possible. However, they recognized the need for considerable flexibility in this matter in deference to current economic conditions.

As impressed as most of the respondents were with the potential training utility of the O'Brien-Drucker content, they pretty much rejected the idea of using this material to create tactical standards for evaluating tank platoon leaders. Although they did suggest several ways in which tactical standards could be evolved from the material, they cautioned that such standards, if they are used at all, should be restricted to use as a means of enhancing the discussion, diagnosis, and remediation of a tank platoon leader's decision-making flaws rather than as an official approach to assessing his tactical leadership abilities. As they saw it, the use of the material for assessing the tank platoon leader's tactical proficiency could easily result in deleterious effects emanating from artificial and invalid tactical performance-scoring systems that at best merely reflect a shadow of the tank platoon leader's true tactical abilities. In this regard, some participants felt that the unique format employed by O'Brien and Drucker, i.e., the component structure with its outline mode of presentation, tends to encourage the exclusive use of the material for evaluation at the expense of training.

The participants' evaluations of the structural aspects of the format tended to be generally favorable, even though they took issue with various aspects of this structure, especially those having to do with comprehension and acceptability on the part of tank platoon leaders and company commanders.

The training objectives content was viewed as being much more valuable than the structural characteristics of the format. A number of participants felt that this format with its component structure and outline mode of presentation should be revised in order to bring into clearer focus the valuable tactical leadership activities and thought processes reflected in the content. This they thought would have the desirable effect of at least putting training on a par with evaluation. Other participants went so far as to suggest that the tactical training content of the material be reassembled into the form of a handy tank platoon leader's guide. They felt that, in this form, the content would best serve the long-term interests of the Army.

Although the respondents did not see the O'Brien-Drucker format or content as a panacea and some even saw the approach as having potentially untoward effects, they generally (with some exceptions) felt that, at the very least, it could be used by trainees as a reference guide or study aid in helping tank platoon leaders to improve their tactical thought processes. In particular, they saw it as being useful in conjunction with the classroom and prior to field exercises with officers lacking in armor experience.

The utility of the O'Brien-Drucker format was regarded as being constrained by:

- o The sheer cumbersomeness (detail) of the material which tends to defy easy comprehension and ready acceptance.
- o The need to integrate the "minutia" of the O'Brien-Drucker "thought processes" into higher level principles that will facilitate learning and retention.
- o A tendency on the part of the component structure and outline mode of presentation to emphasize evaluation at the expense of training.
- o Technical flaws that tend to reduce user acceptance of the material, including:
 - Tactical common sense errors (e.g., platoon leader will direct fire and movement to be conducted only when all of a series of battle field conditions are present).
 - Information that is out-of-date (e.g., platoon movement by sections).
 - Disagreement on criticality (e.g., including tasks showing TOWs monitoring that are not really a responsibility of the tank platoon leader).
 - Repetitiveness of content (e.g., frequent verbatim repetition of statements in different sections of the format).
 - Language usage (e.g., ambiguous or complex expressions like effectiveness of enemy fire or obscuration).

The promise of the O'Brien-Drucker approach seems to be greatest for the individual tank platoon leader trainee who can use their content as a primer and stimulator of tactical thought processes, but not as a gospel for how to

think in combat. If the correctable flaws in the approach are resolved and its highly-detailed content is made more learnable through simplification and organization into meaningful principles, the approach could have reasonably wide utility both in the Army school and field environments.

APPENDIX A
INTERVIEW SCENARIO

- STEP 1 Introduce moderator and associate moderator. Then briefly describe the purpose of the meeting. The purpose is to take a close look at tactical training objectives and standards for tank platoon leaders in field exercises.
- STEP 2 We will not use last names or titles in this meeting. However, we would like to have you print your first name or nickname on the card we have placed in front of you.
- STEP 3 Before we get into this topic we would like you to fill out a brief background questionnaire. (PASS OUT THE QUESTIONNAIRE.) This questionnaire is anonymous and will only be used to compare this group with other groups that we are interviewing. Please write the code number from your name card in the upper right-hand corner of the questionnaire.
- STEP 4 We are going to record all of the comments made during our discussion of tank platoon leader training. The reason for the recording is that we do not want to miss anything important that is said here today. (FILL IN THE RECORDER CODE AND GROUP NUMBER ON THE CASSETTE TAPE LABEL --SIDE A. ALSO ANNOUNCE THIS INFORMATION SO THAT IT GETS RECORDED AT THE FRONT OF THE TAPE. AFTER 60 MINUTES, FLIP TAPE TO SIDE B. AFTER TWO HOURS, LABEL AND INSERT A SECOND TAPE IF NECESSARY AND MARK THIS AS PART II.)
- STEP 5 NOW PROCEED TO THE FIRST TOPIC IN THE DISCUSSION GUIDE.

APPENDIX B
PHASE I DISCUSSION GUIDE

1. Imagine you are trying to develop a manual for the tactical training of tank platoon leaders.
 - o What would you put in that manual? In other words, what specific things should a platoon leader be trained to do in a combat situation? Jot down on the note pad in front of you the most important things the platoon leader should be trained to do. (NOW GO AROUND THE TABLE HAVING EACH PARTICIPANT PRESENT HIS LIST.)
2. Can you give us any specific examples showing how the training received by a platoon leader actually made a difference in the success or failure of a tactical mission?
3. Now, we would like to get your reactions to a method that has been used to develop training objectives for tactical tasks performed by tank platoon leaders. The people who developed this method followed a series of steps:
 - o First they analyzed the descriptions of tank team operations in FM 71-1 and FM 71-2. (HOLD UP FIELD MANUALS.)
 - o Next, they figured out all the tactical things the platoon leader has to do in these operations.
 - o Next, they showed these tasks to experts such as yourself who helped them decide which ones were really critical.
 - o In so doing, they came up with two basic types of critical tasks:
 - Those having a command component and an execution component and . . .
 - Those having a platoon leader action component but no command or execution components.
 - Then they developed a special format for describing training objectives for each type of task and tried this format out on 34 tasks that were rated most critical.
 - o Let's look at the handout to see how their format compares to other formats that have been used to describe training objectives in the Army. (POINT OUT ON THE HANDOUT THE DIFFERENCES IN FORMAT, ESPECIALLY THOSE IN THE NEW METHODOLOGY.)
4. Now we are going to hand out two examples of training objectives that were prepared using the new formats. One is for a command-type task; the other is for a task that does not involve command, but requires some type of action by the platoon leader. Please take a few minutes to look at the general layout for the examples. We will go into the specific descriptions in more detail as we go along.

- o To begin with, what is your overall reaction to this method and the way it handles training objectives?
 - o Do you consider this way of looking at training objectives useful? Why? Why not?
5. Let's look more closely at the decision component which is described in both the command-type task and the action-type task. What is your reaction to this way of looking at training objectives?
 6. Now let's look at the command component which is described only for command-type tasks. What is your reaction to this way of looking at training objectives?
 7. Let's look at the execution component which is described only for command-type tasks. What is your reaction to this way of looking at training objectives?
 8. Now let's look at the action component which is described only for action-type tasks. What is your reaction to this way of looking at training objectives?
 9. Using the same two examples, how can we specify for each task what should be measured in the tank platoon leader's performance during training in order to determine whether or not he is proficient in these tasks?
 - o Under Part C of the decision component and Part C of the execution component, note that principles are described. Could we determine the platoon leader's proficiency from these principles?

APPENDIX C
PHASE II DISCUSSION GUIDE

1. We would like to start this discussion by getting your reactions to a method for describing training objectives for tank platoon leaders. The people who developed this method followed a series of steps:
 - o First they analyzed the descriptions of tank team operations in FM 71-1 and FM 71-2. (HOLD UP FIELD MANUALS.)
 - o Next, they listed out all the different tactical things the platoon leader has to do as part of these operations; in this way, they came up with a list of 191 "tactical tasks."
 - o Next, they got experts such as yourself to help them decide which tasks were the most critical. The critical tasks are listed in the handout we will now pass out. (PAUSE) The tasks are grouped by mission--mission phase--and platoon operation. You will notice under the last column in the handout that there are basically two types of tasks:
 - Those called command tasks where the platoon leader directs platoon members' activities . . . and . . .
 - Those called action tasks where only the platoon leader himself is involved in the activity.
 - o Next they developed a special format for describing the training objectives for each task and then tried out this format on the 34 critical tasks you see in the handout.
2. Let's look at another handout to see how their format compares to other formats that have been used to describe training objectives in the Army. (POINT OUT ON THE GREEN SHEET THE DIFFERENCES IN FORMAT, ESPECIALLY THOSE IN THE NEW METHODOLOGY.)
3. On your critical task listing, the two tasks numbered 1 and 8 have been marked with an asterisk. We are going to use these as examples of training objectives that were spelled out using the special formats. One is for a command-type task; the other is for an action-type task. (PAUSE) Please take a few minutes to look at the general layout of the training objectives for these two tasks, but do not spend too much time trying to read the fine print in the handouts right now because we will go into this detail shortly.
 - o To begin with, what is your overall reaction to this method of organizing the training objectives for critical tank platoon leader tasks?

4. Now let's take a more detailed look at Section V which is called the decision component in both the command and action task formats. This component describes the things the platoon leader needs to consider in making the decision to begin the task.
 - o What is your reaction to the decision component of the format and the way it spells out tank platoon leader training objectives in making decisions?
5. Now let's look at the command component which is concerned with giving the initial and subsequent orders to the platoon members in order to get the task done. This component is shown as Section VI on the command task format.
 - o What is your reaction to the command component of the format and the way it spells out tank platoon leader training objectives in giving commands?
6. Next, let's look at the execution component shown as Section VII in the command task format. This component is concerned with the decision to continue doing or stop doing the task.
 - o What is your reaction to the execution component and the way it spells out tank platoon leader training objectives in making follow-up decisions?
7. Next, let's take a look at the action component shown in the action task format as Section VI. This component emphasizes the information involved and how this information should be handled by the platoon leader.
 - o What is your reaction to the action component and the way it spells out tank platoon leader training objectives in handling important information?
8. What functions are task training objectives for tank platoon leaders supposed to serve?
 - o What is the most useful way to define such training objectives?
 - o How well does the approach described in the handouts do this?
9. Now, suppose we were to add a new section to both the command task format and the action task format called training standards.
 - o How might we take the information given here and convert it to specific training standards?
 - o How meaningful would the feedback here be in helping tank platoon leaders to become proficient?
10. How might refinements in the command task and action task methodology be made in order to produce tactical training standards that will be most beneficial to the Army?

- o We have here (HOLD UP THE DOCUMENT) a copy of TC 17-15-1, which is a draft of the Mission Training Plan for the Division 86 Tank Platoon. Chapter 6 of this document provides mission and task statements, conditions, and standards for each mission and platoon task. The handout we are passing out shows the information for platoon task 179--Perform Fire and Movement During an Attack. (PAUSE) What are your thoughts about using the information in the command task handout to improve and enlarge upon the description given in TC 17-15-1 in order to come up with a set of specific training standards for the platoon leader while the platoon fire and movement task is being performed?
11. Let's suppose that during a field exercise, you are collecting performance standards data on a tank platoon leader for the command task shown on the handout.
 - o What specific resources in personnel, time, cost, material, equipment, etc. would be required in order to do this?
 - o What additional resources in personnel, time, cost, material, equipment, etc. would be required in order to feed back to the platoon leader how he did on this task during the field exercise?
 - o In doing all of this, how helpful would the information shown in the command task handout be and why?
 12. Let's suppose that during a field exercise, you are collecting performance standards data for a tank platoon leader in the action task shown on the handout.
 - o What specific resources in personnel, time, cost, material, equipment, etc. would be required in order to do this?
 - o What additional resources in personnel, time, cost, material, equipment, etc. would be required in order to feed back to the platoon leader how he did on this task during the field exercise?
 - o In doing all of this, how helpful would the information shown in the action task handout be and why?
 13. What are your reactions to collecting and feeding back of standards information on all the 34 critical tasks shown in the previous handout?
 - o Should a priority scheme be used in doing this feedback?
 - o What should the priority be?
 14. At this point, we would like to pass out an anonymous questions sheet in order to get your summary reactions to the methodology we have discussed here today. Please answer each of the four questions on the sheet by circling the letter you feel best describes your reaction. When you have finished answering the questions, please write the code number from your name card in the upper right-hand corner of the questions sheet.

APPENDIX D

CRITICAL TANK PLATOON LEADER TASKS BY MISSION, MISSION PHASE AND PLATOON OPERATION

Mission	Mission Phase	Platoon Operation	Platoon Leader Task	Task Type
Hasty Attack	Fire and Maneuver	Conduct Fire and Maneuver	1. *Issues PRAGO	Action
			2. Directs Movement Into Attack Position	Command
			3. Directs Movement Into Attack Formation	Command
			4. Directs Movement Out of Attack Position	Command
			5. Requests Indirect Fire	Action
			6. Requests Indirect Fire be Adjusted	Action
			7. Directs Targets of Opportunity be Engaged	Command
Movement to Contact	Action on Contact	Immediate Action	8. *Directs Fire and Maneuver be Conducted	Command
			9. Directs Smoke be Popped	Command
			10. Directs Movement Into Defilade Position	Command
			11. Submits SPOTREP	Action
			12. Directs Enemy be Engaged	Command
			Plus Tasks 5 and 6 above	
			13. Designates Targets to TOW Section	Action
Defend Battle Position	Direct Fire	Initiate Direct Fires in Platoon Sector	14. Monitors TOWs	Action
			15. Directs Targets be Engaged with TIS	Command
			16. Requests TOW Section Reinforce Platoon Fire	Action
			17. Submits STAREP	Action
			Plus Tasks 5, 6, 11, and 12 above	
			18. Designates Sectors of Fire	Action
			19. Designates Tank Targets	Action
Occupy Battle Position	Occupy and Organize Battle Position	Organize Platoon Battle Position	20. Checks Positions for Suitability	Action
			21. Directs Tanks Move to Good Fields of Fire	Command
			22. Assigns Area for Supplementary Positions	Action
			23. Directs Range Cards be Prepared	Command
			24. Directs Chemical Alarms be Placed	Command
			25. Directs Obstacles, Mines, and Flares be Installed	Command
			26. Coordinates with FIST Leader	Action
			27. Coordinates with TOW Section Leader	Action
			28. Coordinates with Adjacent Platoon Leaders	Action
			29. Prepares a Fire Plan	Action
			30. Reconnoiters Area for Supplementary Positions	Action
			31. Selects and Announces Withdrawal Routes	Action
			32. Plans Displacement	Action
			33. Requests Company/Team Fire Plan	Action
			34. Requests Wire Communications be Installed	Action

*Tasks discussed in interview

APPENDIX E COMPARISON OF TRAINING OBJECTIVES FORMATS

ARTEP 71-2	Collective training	SOLDIERS MANUAL OF COMMON TASKS FM 21-3	Individual training	ARMOR MOUNTED TACTICAL TRAINING AOB COURSE	Collective training	PROTOTYPE TANK PLATOON LEADER TASKS COMMON TASKS	Individual training	PROTOTYPE TANK PLATOON LEADER FORMAT ACTION TASK	Individual training
TASK	TASK	TASK	TASK	TASK	TASK	TASK	TASK	TASK	TASK
CONDITIONS	CONDITIONS	CONDITIONS	CONDITIONS	CONDITIONS	CONDITIONS	CONDITIONS	CONDITIONS	CONDITIONS	CONDITIONS
STANDARDS	STANDARDS	STANDARDS	STANDARDS	STANDARDS	STANDARDS	STANDARDS	STANDARDS	STANDARDS	STANDARDS
PERFORMANCE MEASURES	PERFORMANCE MEASURES	PERFORMANCE MEASURES	PERFORMANCE MEASURES	PERFORMANCE MEASURES	PERFORMANCE MEASURES	PERFORMANCE MEASURES	PERFORMANCE MEASURES	PERFORMANCE MEASURES	PERFORMANCE MEASURES
o Decision Conditions	o Decision Conditions	o Decision Conditions	o Decision Conditions	o Decision Conditions	o Decision Conditions	o Decision Conditions	o Decision Conditions	o Decision Conditions	o Decision Conditions
o Information Required and Sources	o Information Required and Sources	o Information Required and Sources	o Information Required and Sources	o Information Required and Sources	o Information Required and Sources	o Information Required and Sources	o Information Required and Sources	o Information Required and Sources	o Information Required and Sources
o Decision Principles	o Decision Principles	o Decision Principles	o Decision Principles	o Decision Principles	o Decision Principles	o Decision Principles	o Decision Principles	o Decision Principles	o Decision Principles
ACTION COMPONENT	ACTION COMPONENT	ACTION COMPONENT	ACTION COMPONENT	ACTION COMPONENT	ACTION COMPONENT	ACTION COMPONENT	ACTION COMPONENT	ACTION COMPONENT	ACTION COMPONENT
o Information Contents	o Information Contents	o Information Contents	o Information Contents	o Information Contents	o Information Contents	o Information Contents	o Information Contents	o Information Contents	o Information Contents
o Procedures (Steps)	o Procedures (Steps)	o Procedures (Steps)	o Procedures (Steps)	o Procedures (Steps)	o Procedures (Steps)	o Procedures (Steps)	o Procedures (Steps)	o Procedures (Steps)	o Procedures (Steps)

APPENDIX F

COMMAND TASK FORMAT

I. TASK: Platoon Leader Directs Fire and Maneuver to Be Conducted

- II. **DESCRIPTION:** During combat operations the platoon leader may be required to direct that fire and maneuver be conducted. Fire and maneuver is a technique for moving against an enemy force that constitutes a threat to the platoon. This movement technique can be performed during a deliberate attack, a counterattack, or during the defense of a battle position. When it is performed during an attack or during a counterattack, the platoon would be moving toward an objective as part of a company/team operation. During the operation, part of the company/team would provide direct fire on the objective from an overwatch position; indirect fires, such as artillery or mortar, would also be provided. The platoon leader would direct that fire and maneuver be conducted if during the movement toward the objective enemy direct fire could not be suppressed by suppressive or supporting fires. Once fire and maneuver has begun, it should be maintained until the enemy is no longer a threat or until the assault position is reached. During the defense of a position, the platoon would conduct fire and maneuver to move to better firing positions or to occupy a flank firing position. The platoon leader's responsibility for this task begins when he decides that fire and maneuver must be conducted. His responsibility for this task ends when the enemy is no longer a threat or when the platoon reaches the assault position or a flank firing position.

III. ARTEP MISSIONS AND TASKS SUPPORTED BY FIRE AND MANEUVER

A. Attack

- | | |
|------------------------------|------------|
| 1. Employ Direct Fire | (3-IV-2-3) |
| 2. Employ Supporting Fire | (3-IV-2-4) |
| 3. React to Indirect Fire | (3-IV-2-5) |
| 4. Take Action on Contact | (3-IV-2-6) |
| 5. Conduct Fire and Maneuver | (3-IV-2-7) |
| 6. Conduct a Hasty Attack | (3-IV-2-8) |

B. Defend

- | | |
|------------------------------|------------|
| 1. Employ Supporting Fire | (3-IV-3-5) |
| 2. Employ Direct Fire | (3-IV-3-6) |
| 3. Defend a Battle Position | (3-IV-3-7) |
| 4. Conduct Fire and Maneuver | (3-IV-3-8) |

IV. CONDITIONS REQUIRING FIRE AND MANEUVER

- A. A tank platoon participating in a tactical movement, an attack on an objective, or the defense of a position.
- B. Enemy fire that is a threat to the platoon.
- C. Terrain that is negotiable to the platoon, contains overwatch positions, and provides cover and concealment.
- D. Visibility sufficient for intra-platoon control.

V. DECISION COMPONENT

A. Conditions Affecting Decisions Involved in Directing Fire and Maneuver to be Conducted

1. Availability of supporting fire.
2. Effectiveness of supporting fire.
3. Availability of suppressive fire.
4. Effectiveness of suppressive fire.
5. Effectiveness of enemy direct fire.
6. Availability of cover and concealment.
7. Trafficability
8. Visibility

B. Information Required and Sources

1. Enemy
 - (a) Is the enemy direct fire effective?
Sources: IC reports and personal observation.
 - (b) Does the enemy have tank defeating weapons, and if so, what type, how many, and where?
Sources: Company/team operation order or frag order, IC reports, and personal observation.
2. Terrain and Weather
 - (a) Are cover and concealment adequate for fire and maneuver?
Sources: Maps, IC reports, and personal observation.
 - (b) Is the terrain sufficiently trafficable?
Sources: Maps, IC reports, and personal observation.
 - (c) Is visibility adequate for intra-platoon control?
Sources: IC reports and personal observation.

3 Troops Available

(a) Are supporting fires available?

Sources: Company/team operation order or frag order and the FIST.

(b) Are supporting fires effective?

Sources: TC reports and personal observation.

(c) Are suppressive fires available?

Sources: Company/team operation order or frag order and suppressive fire platoon.

(d) Are suppressive fires effective?

Sources: Suppressive fire platoon, TC reports, and personal observation.

C. Decision Principles

Conduct fire and maneuver when all of the following conditions are present

- 1 Enemy direct fires are effective.
- 2 Cover and concealment are sufficient.
- 3 Overwatch positions are available.
- 4 Visibility is sufficient for intra-platoon control.
- 5 Terrain is sufficiently trafficable for fire and maneuver.

VI. COMMAND COMPONENT [GIVE VISUAL SIGNALS OR RADIO ORDER]

A. Initial Signal or Order Should Contain the Following Information:

1. The platoon section that will provide support by fire initially.
2. The platoon section that will maneuver initially.
3. The subsequent overwatch position for the maneuver section.
4. The command for the platoon support by fire section to suppress enemy fire.
5. The command for the platoon maneuver section to move to the subsequent overwatch position.

B. Subsequent Signals or Orders Should Contain the Following Information:

1. The subsequent overwatch positions.

VII. EXECUTION COMPONENT

A. Conditions Affecting the Execution of Fire and Maneuver

1. Trafficability
2. Obscuration
3. Effectiveness of enemy direct fire
4. Effectiveness of enemy indirect fire
5. Unexpected obstacles
6. Tank losses

B. Information Required and Sources

1. Enemy

(a) Is enemy direct fire effective?

Sources: TC reports and personal observation.

(b) Is enemy indirect fire effective?

Sources: TC reports and personal observation.

2. Terrain and Weather

(a) Is the terrain trafficable for fire and maneuver?

Sources: Maps, TC reports, and personal observation.

(b) Does obscuration significantly affect fire and maneuver?

Sources: TC reports and personal observation.

(c) What obstacles have been encountered?

Sources: TC reports and personal observation.

3. Troops Available.

(a) What tank losses have occurred?

Sources: TC reports and personal observation.

C. Execution Principles

1. Use shorter bounds as trafficability decreases.
2. Stop fire and maneuver if obscuration prevents intra-platoon control.
3. Stop fire and maneuver if enemy indirect fire is highly effective.
4. When the maneuvering section is receiving heavy direct fire, the platoon requests additional fire support and the maneuvering section continues to the overwatch position.
5. When the maneuvering section is stopped by direct fire, when the maneuvering section has only one operational tank, or when it is confronted with an unexpected obstacle, the section should occupy a defilade position and engage the enemy. The platoon leader should then order the support by fire section to maneuver to a designated overwatch position.
6. When neither section can maneuver or suppress the enemy the platoon leader should reassess the situation and submit a SITREP.

APPENDIX G

ACTION TASK FORMAT

I. TASK: Platoon Leader Issues Frag Order

- II. **DESCRIPTION:** During combat operations the platoon leader may be required to give a frag order in response to a company/team frag order or in response to a situation not covered in a company/team operation order or frag order. A frag order is a combat order containing information of immediate concern to specified subordinate units. It may omit elements normally found in a complete combat order that: 1) have not been changed since the issuance of the last complete order, 2) are not essential to the performance of the mission, 3) might delay or complicate transmissions, and 4) are unavailable or incomplete at the time of the issue. The frag order must be concise, but not at the expense of clarity or omission of essential information. Its content follows the same sequence as a complete order. The frag order is usually given by radio, although it may be given orally if radios are not functioning or if security requirements preclude the use of radios. If conditions permit, the frag order should be given after halting the platoon and assembling the tank commanders. The platoon leader should give the frag order as soon as the situation dictates such action, and the order must be acknowledged by each tank commander. The frag order may be used at any time and during any tactical operation. The platoon leader's responsibility for this task begins when: 1) he receives a frag order from the company/team commander, 2) the platoon encounters unexpected enemy reaction to a platoon action, 3) the platoon is confronted with unforeseen terrain or weather conditions, or 4) platoon operations have not met or have exceeded time requirements. His responsibility for this task ends when all tank commanders acknowledge the frag order.

III. ARTEP MISSIONS AND TASKS SUPPORTED BY ISSUING A FRAG ORDER

A. Move

1. Conduct a Tactical Road March (3-IV-1-5)
2. Conduct Tactical Movement (3-IV-1-6)
3. Move in Traveling (3-IV-1-7)
4. Move in Traveling Overwatch (3-IV-1-8)
5. Move in Bounding Overwatch (3-IV-1-9)
6. Provide Overwatch (3-IV-1-10)

B. Attack

1. Move (3-IV-2-1)
2. Employ Direct Fire (3-IV-2-3)
3. Take Action on Contact (3-IV-2-6)
4. Conduct a Hasty Attack (3-IV-2-8)
5. Support/Attack by Fire (3-IV-2-9)
6. Breach Minefields and Obstacles (3-IV-2-10)
7. Bypass (3-IV-2-12)
8. Disengage (3-IV-2-13)

C. Defend

1. Move (3-IV-3-1)
2. Occupy Battle Position (3-IV-3-2)
3. Employ Direct Fire (3-IV-3-6)
4. Defend a Battle Position (3-IV-3-7)
5. Disengage (3-IV-3-9)

IV. CONDITIONS REQUIRING A FRAG ORDER

- A. A tank platoon participating in a tactical movement, an attack on an objective, or the defense of a position.
- B. One of the following conditions is present:
1. Receipt of a company/team frag order.
 2. Unexpected enemy reaction to a platoon action.
 3. Unforeseen terrain or weather conditions.
 4. Time requirements not met or exceeded.

V. DECISION COMPONENT

A. Conditions affecting decisions involved in issuing frag order

1. Receipt of a company/team frag order
2. Unexpected enemy reaction to a platoon action
3. Unforeseen terrain or weather conditions
4. Time requirements not met or exceeded.

B. Information required and sources

1. Mission

- a. What changes does the company/team frag order make in the original company/team operation order?

Sources: Original company/team operation order and the company/team frag order.

2. Enemy

- a. Will the unexpected enemy reaction jeopardize mission accomplishment?

Sources: Company/team operation order or frag order, IC reports, and personal observation and judgment.

3. Terrain and Weather

- a. Will unforeseen terrain and weather conditions jeopardize mission accomplishment?

Sources: Company/team operation order or frag order, IC reports, and personal observation and judgment.

4. Time

- a. Will time constraints jeopardize mission accomplishment?

Sources: Company/team operation order or frag order and personal judgment.

C. Decision Principles

Issue a frag order when one of the following conditions is present:

1. Receipt of a company/team frag order.
2. Unexpected enemy reaction to a platoon action jeopardizes mission accomplishment.
3. Unforeseen terrain or weather conditions jeopardize mission accomplishment.
4. Time constraints jeopardize mission accomplishment.

VI. ACTION COMPONENT

A. The frag order should contain the following information:

1. New directions to the tank commanders for those elements of the platoon operation order that require a change as the result of a company/team frag order or as the result of a change in the battlefield environment.
2. Paragraphs and sub-paragraphs of a platoon operation order which are normally changed to accommodate a company/team frag order or a change in the battlefield environment are listed below:
 - a. Situation
 - (1) Enemy forces.
 - (2) Friendly forces.
 - b. Mission
 - c. Execution
 - (1) Concept of operation.
 - (2) Platoon task.
 - (3) Coordinating instructions.

B. The frag order will be given by radio when:

1. The platoon leader has radio contact with all tank commanders.
2. One of the following conditions is present:
 - a. The platoon must keep moving.
 - b. The enemy is aware of the platoon's presence.

C. The frag order will be given orally when one of the following conditions is present

1. The platoon leader does not have radio contact with all tank commanders.
2. The platoon is halted.
3. The enemy is not aware of the platoon's presence
4. Time constraints do not preclude halting the platoon

APPENDIX H

EXTRACT FROM THE DIVISION 86 TANK PLATOON
MISSION TRAINING PLAN (TC 17-15-1)

TASK NUMBER: 179

TASK STATEMENT: Perform Fire and Movement During an Attack

CONDITIONS: Mission can be conducted under any environmental conditions on trafficable soil as part of any offensive operation.

STANDARDS: The platoon:

1. Crosses the LD at the designated time, using the designated movement technique, and along the designated axis/axes.
 2. Maintains radio-listening silence until contact is made.
 3. Maneuvers to the objective so that the platoon gains the initiative, avoids detection, and minimizes losses.
 4. Executes the scheme of fire and movement support plan per the unit SOP.
-

Yes	No	NE

APPENDIX I

POST-INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. During the interview, we closely examined prototype tactical training objectives for 2 out of 34 tank platoon leader tasks that are considered critical in combat. Based on this sample and on the overview we gave you of the steps that were used to come up with these objectives, how would you grade the methodology as to its appropriateness in describing what the tank platoon leader should be trained to do? [Circle one]

A A⁻ B⁺ B B⁻ C⁺ C C⁻ D⁺ D D⁻ F

2. How would you grade the methodology as to the potential it has for being extended to include (perhaps as an additional section) the description of specific standards for judging a tank platoon leader's tactical performance? [Circle one]

A A⁻ B⁺ B B⁻ C⁺ C C⁻ D⁺ D D⁻ F

3. How would you grade the methodology as to the potential it has for providing the performance data necessary to evaluate a tank platoon leader during a field exercise? [Circle one]

A A⁻ B⁺ B B⁻ C⁺ C C⁻ D⁺ D D⁻ F

4. How would you grade the methodology as to the potential it has for improving a tank platoon leader's tactical performance through appropriate after-exercise feedback? [Circle one]

A A⁻ B⁺ B B⁻ C⁺ C C⁻ D⁺ D D⁻ F

GROUP PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE

- PT 5520 (REV)

- | | | |
|--|---------------------|-----------------------------|
| 11. Staff Experience (Officer): | | <u>No. of
Months</u> |
| S1/S4 | _____ | |
| S2/S3 | _____ | |
| Armored Tactics Instructor | _____ | |
| Other Tactics Instructor | _____ | |
| Other Instructor | _____ | |
| Other | _____ | |
| 12. Command Experience (Officer): | | |
| Tank Platoon | _____ | |
| Tank Company | _____ | |
| Cavalry Platoon | _____ | |
| Cavalry Troop | _____ | |
| Other Platoon | _____ | |
| Other Company | _____ | |
| 13. Experience (NCO): | | |
| Tank Commander | _____ | |
| Tank Platoon Sergeant | _____ | |
| Master Gunner | _____ | |
| Other | _____ | |
| Other | _____ | |
| 14. Number of Gunnery Cycles Experienced: | | <u>No. of
Cycles</u> |
| Tank | _____ | |
| Other | _____ | |
| Other | _____ | |
| 15. Participation in NTC Exercises or Other Major Training Exercises (e.g.
TEAM SPIRIT, REFORGER, BRAVE SHIELD, JACK FROST) | | |
| | <u>Location</u> | <u>No. of
Exercises</u> |
| | Far East | _____ |
| | Middle East | _____ |
| | Continental America | _____ |
| | Europe | _____ |
| | Other | _____ |

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